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We are accustomed to think of the trust as a branch of property law. The
Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines the trust as "a fiduciary relationship
with respect to property,"' and the codes2 and treatises 3 say similar things.
This way of speaking about the trust omits an important dimension.
The contractarian claim. In truth, the trust is a deal, a bargain about how
the trust assets are to be managed and distributed. To be sure, the trust
originates exactly where convention says it does, with property. The
Restatement says, "A trust cannot be created unless there is trust property."
4
The owner, called the settlor, transfers the trust property to an intermediary,
the trustee, to hold it for the beneficiaries. We treat the trustee as the new
owner for the purpose of managing the property, while the trust deal strips the
trustee of the benefits of ownership.
The distinguishing feature of the trust is not the background event, not the
transfer of property to the trustee, but the trust deal that defines the powers and
responsibilities of the trustee in managing the property. Sometimes the trust
deal also confers significant discretion upon the trustee over dispositive
provisions, that is, in allocating the beneficial interests among the beneficiaries.
The settlor and the trustee may express their deal in detailed terms drafted for
the particular trust, or they may be content to adopt the default rules of trust
law. Either way, the deal between settlor and trustee is functionally indistin-
guishable from the modem third-party-beneficiary contract. Trusts are
contracts.
Trust without contract. The contractarian account, presupposing a separate
trustee, does not embrace the declaration of trust, which is a mode of trust
creation that allows the transferor of property simply to declare himself or
herself trustee for the transferee.5 This two-party trust lacks a separate trustee.
The settlor cannot contract with himself or herself, and accordingly, we see
that trust can arise without contract, without the characteristic deal between
settlor and third-party trustee. Because the declaration of trust dispenses with
what is normally the most desirable attribute of the trust, that is, the ability to
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). The full definition is quite convoluted: "a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held to
equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person, which arises as a result of a
manifestation of an intention to create it." This formulation postpones to the final phrase its imperfect
acknowledgement of the central dynamic of the trust, the deal between the settlor and the trustee, which
in my view "manifest[s]" not only the settlor's "intention to create it" but also the trustee's intention to
perform it.
2. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(4) (vest 1984) (Texas Trust Code).
3. See, e.g., I AUSTIN W. SCOTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 2.3-2.6, at 40-48
(4th ed. 1987-89) [hereinafter Scorr & FRATCHER, TRUSTS].
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 74 (1959).
5. "A trust may be created by ... a declaration by the owner of property that he holds it as trustee
for another person .... Id. § 17(a).
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have a third party manage the trust property, the declaration of trust plays a
relatively peripheral role in modem practice. In order not to interrupt the main
theme of this Article, I discuss the declaration of trust in an appendix. I
explain that the declaration sometimes serves as a way station to the creation
of a true third-party trust, and that in other settings the declaration turns out
to be a doctrinal ruse for validating transfers that are not in function trusts.
The contractarian theme. This Article sets forth the grounds for
understanding the conventional three-party trust as a prevailingly contractarian
institution. More is at stake in this choice between contract and property
formulations of the trust than mere labelling. In Part IV of this Article, I
explain why the law of fiduciary administration, which is the centerpiece of the
modem trust, is overwhelmingly contractarian. Especially in conflict-of-interest
cases, greater attention to the contractarian character of the trust would
improve outcomes.
6
Sensitivity to the contractarian character of the trust can be traced to
Maitland's celebrated lectures on Equity,7 published posthumously in 1909.
Even in the late fourteenth century, observed Maitland, when the English
Chancellor first began to enforce the trust, the trust "generally ha[d] its origin
in something that we can not but call an agreement." 8 "[The] trust was
originally regarded as an obligation, in point of fact a contract though not
usually so called."'9 F.H. Lawson, writing in 1953 in one of the central works
of modem comparative law, pointed out that "the three-cornered relation of
settlor, trustee, and [beneficiary] ... is easily explained in the modem law in
terms of a contract for the benefit of a third party."'0
Our black letter law has resisted the insight that trusts are contracts. The
second Restatement of 1959, carrying forward the language of the first Restate-
ment of 1935," declares: "The creation of a trust is conceived of as a
conveyance of the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as a
contract."'"
This Article proceeds under four parts: history, doctrine, function, and
comparison.
History. There was always a component of contract in the trust
relationship, but profound changes in the character and function of the trust
from the second half of the nineteenth century onward have intensified the
6. See infra text accompanying notes 205-14.
7. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES (John Brunyate rev. ed., 2d ed. 1936)
(A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1st ed. 1909) (Maitland died in 1906.).
8. Id. at 28; see also id. at 29 ("[Ihe Chancellor begins to enforce a personal right.., which in truth
is a contractual right, a right created by a promise.").
9. Id. at 110.
10. F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 200 (1953).
11. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1935).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959). Further, "Although the trustee by
accepting the office of trustee subjects himself to the duties of administration, his duties are not contractual
in nature." Id. § 169 cmt. c; cf. id. §§ 130, 131.
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contractarian basis of the trust. The trust originated as a conveyancing device
for holding real property, often ancestral land. The modem trust has become
a management regime for a portfolio of financial assets.
Part II of the Article reviews the central elements in this historical
transformation of the trust, changes affecting (1) the nature of wealth, as
financial assets displaced family land as the typical trust property; (2) the
management responsibilities of trustees, who ceased being bare stakeholders
of realty and became active portfolio managers; (3) the personality of trustees,
as gentlemen stakeholders gave way to institutional fiduciaries; and (4) the
locus of safeguard for beneficiaries within trust law, as fiduciary law came to
replace the former reliance upon restricting trustees' powers.
Doctrine. Part III examines concerns that have been voiced against the
contractarian account of the trust in doctrinal discourse: (1) the refusal of
English law to recognize the third-party-beneficiary contract; (2) the argument
that equitable tracing as practiced in the law of trusts precludes the
contractarian account; and (3) fears based on the fusion of law and equity. I
show that these supposed objections to the contractarian view of the trust are
unpersuasive.
Function. Part IV of the Article develops the intrinsic functional
correspondence between contract and trust. The bedrock elements of contract
are consensual formation and consensual terms. Trust displays both. I follow
for trust the insights of the law-and-economics literature, which has
emphasized the contractarian basis of fiduciary duties in modem corporation
law. I concentrate on the two central duties of trust fiduciary law, loyalty and
prudence. My theme is that, despite decades of pulpit-thumping rhetoric about
the sanctity of fiduciary obligations, fiduciary duties in trust law are
unambiguously contractarian. The rules of trust fiduciary law mean to capture
the likely understanding of the parties to the trust deal, which is why both the
duty of loyalty and the duty of prudence yield to the more particularized
intentions that the parties may choose to express or imply in their trust deal.
I depict the default regime of trust law as a type of standardized contract, and
I point to some instances in which the contractarian perspective should
improve outcomes in trust law.
Comparative law. I conclude the Article, in Part V, by casting a short
glance at European law. The Continental legal tradition did not develop the
trust. Comparative lawyers understand that the civil law systems achieve
mostly by means of contract what the Anglo-American systems do through the
trust device-another important indication of how close the trust lies to
contract in function. Civil law systems act on this insight in conflict-of-laws
cases. When a nontrust jurisdiction confronts an attempted trust, the standard
analysis is to assimilate the trust to the contract law of the nontrust
jurisdiction.
1995]
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Beyond trusts. This Article draws upon bodies of scholarly literature and
supporting legal authorities-historical, doctrinal, economic, and
comparative-that have developed in substantial isolation from each other. In
emphasizing a contractarian view of the trust, the Article falls within an
intellectual movement broader than trust law. Contract has become the
dominant doctrinal current in modem American law. In fields ranging from
corporations' 3 and partnership, 14 to landlord and tenant,
5 to servitudes, 16
to the law of marriage, 17 scholars have come to understand our legal rules as
resting mainly on imputed bargains that are susceptible to alteration by actual
bargains.'8
It is not my purpose to fold the law of trusts into the law of contract. Like
other legal institutions that have been deeply influenced by modern
contractarian analysis, such as the corporation or the marriage, the trust has an
institutional integrity and convenience that fully justifies its independence. My
purpose is simply to show that contractarian analysis illumines, and at times
helps us improve upon, what we do with the trust.
Exclusions. This Article is devoted to the gratuitous private trust, our
characteristic device for conditioned wealth transfer within the family. The
Article excludes commercial trusts. The flexibility of the trust as a regime for
creating and managing multiple interests in assets has encouraged transaction
planners to use the trust in a wide variety of commercial settings.'9 For
13. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW (1991); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
14. The recent revisions to the Uniform Partnership Act greatly augment the sphere for contract to
defeat the default regime, including the fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith, subject to essentially
procedural requirements of precise drafting and to an unconscionability check on contract terms that are
"manifestly unreasonable." REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 103, 404, 6 U.L.A. 288, 313 (1994).
15. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV.
503, 503-04 (1982); see also Edward Chase, The Property-Contract Theme in Landlord and Tenant Law:
A Critical Commentary on Schoshinski's American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 189
(1982).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.16 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3,
1993); Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1353 (1982). For citations to the literature on condominium and homeowner associations as consensual
regimes, see JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 935-36 (3d ed. 1993).
17. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act encapsulates the modem position. Section 201 defines
marriage as "a personal relationship... arising out of a civil contract." UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT
§ 201, 9A U.L.A. 160 (1973). On the range of contracting found in modem marriage behavior, see Marjorie
M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 207 (1982).
In the nineteenth century marriage was a status, not a package of default rules. There were "strong and
stringent public expectations as to conduct and responsibility." Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital
Expectations in Nineteenth Century America, 80 GEo. L.J. 95, 97 (1991). "[B]eing married meant
subjecting oneself to a known and coercive public relationship." Id. at 96.
18. The contractarian analysis of the foundational work of modem law and economics, R.H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), has reinforced these developments in recent decades.
19. For a succinct account of trusts for business and security purposes, see William F. Fratcher, Trust,
in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW §§ 44-51, at 37-42 (1973) [hereinafter
Fratcher, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA] (pamphlet print). A variety of current applications are discussed
in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992).
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example, investment in the American capital markets is now increasingly
conducted through the medium of the investment trust (mutual fund)20 or the
pension trust.21 In the nineteenth century, when the business corporation was
in its infancy, great enterprises organized themselves as business trusts,
22
begetting the regulatory response that is still known as antitrust. The flexibility
of the trust has led to its use for securitization in corporate finance. A trust
indenture underlies every bond issue,23 and deeds of trust are common
vehicles for mortgage finance and for an array of other types of transaction.
In these commercial usages, the contractarian character of the trust is
transparent.24
Further, I exclude from this account the charitable trust, a special-purpose
institution that inhabits the far end of the trust spectrum, where contractarian
autonomy is more restrained. Charitable trusts are quasi-public institutions that
must satisfy standards of public benefit articulated both in the common law2'
and in the tax code and regulatory law.26
Also distinct from the present topic is the constructive trust, a species of
equitable remedy,27 comparable in function to the injunction or the decree of
specific performance. The constructive trust is imposed coercively, as a means
of correcting wrongdoing or remedying unjust enrichment, in settings that
may initially be remote from trust.29 The ordinary private trust, by contrast,
is a consensual relationship, voluntarily assumed by the trustee.
Thus, the present Article is devoted to the core function of the trust, as a
regime for implementing gratuitous transfers through contractarian measures.
20. As of June 1995, total net assets of mutual funds were $1.8 trillion. INVESTMENT CO. INST.,
TRENDS IN MUTUAL FUND ACIvITY tbl. 1 (June 1995).
21. Estimates for pension assets as of 1993 ranged between $4.6 and $4.8 trillion. JOHN H. LANGBEIN
& BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 20 (2d ed. 1995).
22. See generally Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Modem Status of the Massachusetts or
Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3d 704 (1978).
23. See generally ROBERT I. LANDAU, CORPORATE TRUST 21-50 (4th ed. 1992) (outlining nature and
use of trust indentures).
24. "[A]n indenture trustee is more like a stakeholder whose duties and obligations are exclusively
defined by the terms of the indenture agreement." Meckel v. Continental Resources Co., 758 F.2d 811, 816
(2d Cir. 1985).
25. The doctrine of charitable purposes limits charitable trusts to the promotion of objects such as
relief of the poor and the advancement of education, religion, and health. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 368 (1959).
26. The charitable trust was until the nineteenth century the only device available to private citizens
for organizing eleemosynary endeavors. The charitable corporation is now the favored American form for
more complex charitable entities. On the mechanics, see EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND
CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 231 (1974).
27. Discussed in I DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3(2), at 392-401 (2d ed. 1993).
28. "A constructive trust does not, like an express trust, arise because of a manifestation of an
intention to create it, but it is imposed as a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment." RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. a (1937). See generally GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (rev. 2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter BOGERT, TRUSTS].
29. "The constructive trust is not in fact a trust, but a remedy which is explained by analogy to trusts."
I DOBBS, supra note 27, at 401. The fallacy of reasoning from the constructive trust to the real trust still
appears on occasion. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. 879, 910.
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II. FROM CONVEYANCE TO MANAGEMENT: THE HISTORICAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE TRUST
Trusts are gifts. Most gifts are so simple that the donor has no reason to
use a trust. The donor just delivers the asset, conveys realty, registers securities
in the donee's name, or executes a deed of gift.
30
The simple gift is a two-party transfer, from transferor (donor) to
transferee (donee). The ordinary trust, by contrast, entails a three-party
relationship, in which the donor (settlor) arranges with the trustee to divide the
donee's interest between trustee and beneficiary. In the time-honored
formulation, the trustee takes legal title to the property for the benefit of the
beneficiary. "[Tihe normal private trust is essentially a gift, projected on the
plane of time and so subjected to a management regime."'
Inserting a trustee between the beneficiary and the donative interest is
manifestly clumsy and costly. The donor who structures a gift in this way
expects compensating advantages. The advantages and the uses of the trust
have undergone fundamental change from the origins of the trust as a
conveyancing device in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to its modern role
as an institution for managing financial assets.
A. The Early Trust as a Means of Conveyance
The trust developed at the end of the Middle Ages, an epoch in which real
estate was the principal form of wealth. The primary purpose of the trust was
to facilitate the transfer of freehold land within the family.32 The law
governing the transmission of freehold land was deeply afflicted by feudal
restrictions meant originally to concentrate landholdings for military and
related advantages. Long after the feudal system lapsed, burdensome feudal
landholding rules endured. Particularly resented were (1) the rule requiring that
freehold land pass by descent rather than by will, hence that land was not
devisable; (2) the rigid shares of primogeniture and dower; and (3) the bizarre
fiscal exactions, called wardship and marriage, that functioned as penal transfer
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 31.1 & cmt. b (1992) (delivery);
id. § 32.1 (deed).
31. Bernard Rudden, Book Review, 44 MOD. L. REV. 610, 610 (1981).
Because trusts originate in gifts, black letter trust law has not required consideration to create a trust,
"other than the transfer of the property" from settlor to trustee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 29
(1959). The contract between settlor and trustee that is emphasized in this Article is supported by
ponsideration. Trustees are now routinely compensated for their services. See infra text accompanying note
65. Even when not, the trustee's promise to hold the property for the beneficiary, which induces the settlor
to transfer the property to the trustee, supplies bargained-for consideration within the meaning of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
32. Trusts for charitable purposes, in particular for the Franciscans, whose vow of poverty prevented
them from owning property directly, also figured in the early history of the trust. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK
& FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 231,
237-38 (2d ed. 1898).
[Vol. 105: 625
Law of Trusts
taxes on minors.33 Landowners made conveyances in trust3 "in order to
protect themselves and their families against the gross injustices of a system
of land law which was centuries out of date.' 35 The trust allowed landowners
"to make decent provision for their wives, daughters and younger sons and to
prevent escheat" when the landholders were not survived by descendants.36
Transferring land to trustees neatly defeated the feudal restrictions.
Suppose the prototypical case, in which the settlor conveyed freehold land to
trustees, who agreed to hold the land for the settlor for life and then to convey
to selected family members as the remainder beneficiaries. Because the trustees
were the nominal owners of the freehold, when the settlor died none of the
feudal rules that turned on descent were triggered. The trustees continued to
own the land, and they would then convey it to the remainder beneficiaries as
they had undertaken.
The trustees of these early trusts were mere stakeholders, little more than
nominees, with no serious powers or responsibilities of management.
Commonly, the beneficiaries lived on the land and managed it. In the example
I have given, the trustees' only significant duty was to hold until the settlor's
death, and then to put themselves out of business by conveying the freehold
to the remainder beneficiaries. 7
Long into the nineteenth century, the trust remained primarily a branch of
the law of conveyancing. The trust was a means of transferring and holding
title to real estate. Consult the early treatises on trusts, Gilbert38 (three
editions from 1734 to 1811) and Sanders39 (five editions from 1791 to 1844),
and you find works completely devoted to conveyancing. The modem law of
fiduciary administration is simply not detectable in these books. Thus, well
into the nineteenth century, the function of the law of trusts was remote from
modem practice.
33. See generally 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 446-48 (3d ed. 1945) (16
vols. 1922-1966).
34. Technically, to uses, the precursor of the modem trust. The capsule account in the text collapses
the saga of the late medieval use into the trust. For more detail, see, e.g., A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY
OF THE LAND LAW 199-207 (2d ed. 1986).
35. Fratcher, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, § 9, at 12.
36. Id. For detail on the techniques by which the trust (use) was manipulated in the fourteenth century
to obtain will-like results, see J.M. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM: 1215-1540, at 118-26,
148-56 (1968).
37. The trustees' duties were "to permit the [beneficiary] to occupy the land and enjoy the rents and
profits," to defend the title at law, and "to convey the land as directed by the [beneficiary]." Fratcher,
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, § 11, at 15 (citing Bacon and Coke).
38. I have not seen a first edition. Yale has the second edition: GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF
USES AND TRUSTS (London, Henry Lintot, 2d ed. 1741).
39. FRANCIS W. SANDERS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND LAWS OF USES AND TRUSTS, INCLUDING
A TREATISE ON CONVEYANCES AT COMMON LAW; AND THOSE DERIVING THEIR EFFECT FROM THE
STATUTE OF USES (London, E. & R. Brooke, Ist ed. 1791).
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B. Why Early Trust Law De-emphasized Contract
Recall Maitland's insight that "a trust generally has its origin in something
that we can not but call an agreement." 40 Maitland was asking why the early
law did not immediately assimilate the trust to the law of contract. His answer
has never been doubted. The common law of contract was too primitive to do
the job. "If ... in the fourteenth century our law of contract had taken its
modem form, I think that the courts of law would have been compelled to say
'Yes, here is an agreement; therefore it is a legally enforceable
...41contract ....
1. Failings of Covenant
The case that the law of trusts must be able to remedy, quaintly known as
the problem of the "faithless feoffees," arises when the trustees promise the
settlor to devote the trust property to the beneficiaries and accept the property,
but then appropriate it to themselves.4"
By the late fourteenth century, covenant, the main contract writ of English
law, suffered two grievous shortcomings that rendered it ineffectual as a means
of enforcing the trust deal. Under the writ of covenant, the plaintiff needed to
have the contract evidenced in a sealed instrument.43 If, therefore, no sealed
instrument had been created, or if the deed had been destroyed, stolen, or lost,
the case was beyond remedy in covenant.
Worse, the common law courts would grant only damages, not specific
performance, to remedy breach of covenant.' The trust beneficiary wanted
the ancestral land, not money damages. 45
40. MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 28.
41. Id. Maitland also thought that there was a strategic advantage to keeping trust enforcement in the
ill-defined realm of the Chancellor's discretion in equity, rather than recognizing these deals at law. The
feudal exactions that the trust avoided burdened most landowners but benefited overlords, especially the
king, who were reluctant to lose the revenue. Id. at 29-30. By analogizing the early trust to the underlying
estates in land, the Chancellors helped cover up (certainly from the king, perhaps from themselves) the
extent of their departure from the feudal landholding regime. Equity follows the law, ran the maxim, and
thus the departures were secreted in what was otherwise a law-imitating rubric. Id. at 32.
42. For an example, recited in a petition to the Chancellor from the 1390s, see SELECt CASES IN
CHANCERY: 1364-1471, at 48-49 (William P. Baildon ed., London, Selden Soc'y vol. 10, 1896).
43. C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 257-58 (1949); A.W.B. SIMPSON,
A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 10 (1975).
44. FIFOOT, supra note 43, at 259.
45. Debt, the other contract-type writ, was even less effective. Id. at 229-33. As late as Blackstone,
contract was subordinated to conveyancing. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440-70 (4 vols.
1765-69); see also 3 id. at *153-66. The first published treatise on contracts was J.J. POWELL, ESSAY
UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACrS AND AGREEMENTS (Dublin, Chamberlaine & Rice 1790).
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2. Hostility to Assignment
Deep into the nineteenth century, the common law greatly restricted the
assignability of choses in action.46 By treating the beneficiary as having a
property interest in the lands held in the trust, and not just a claim derived
(assigned) from the settlor, the trust sidestepped the rule against assignment.47
3. The Role of Procedure
The shortcomings of the common law of contract were deeply connected
to procedural weaknesses of the common law.48 The task of common law
courts was to preside over the pleading of cases for jury trial. Common law
judges did not investigate or find facts. There was no pretrial discovery system
for gathering evidence, and thus, no way to examine alleged trustees about the
trust deal or about their conduct.49 At first, the common law jury was self-
informing. By the sixteenth century, juries were hearing evidence presented at
trial. However, the common law courts treated the parties to civil litigation as
disqualified from testifying on account of their personal interest in the
outcome,50 a rule that would have silenced most of the relevant persons in a
trust case.
These weaknesses of common law civil procedure explain the insistence
on the sealed instrument under the writ of covenant. The common law courts
were simply incapable of taking evidence on the terms of a deal. By contrast,
Chancery, the court that enforced the trust, proceeded by examining individual
witnesses, including the parties, under oath.5 ' Informed through these
disclosures, the Chancellor could declare the trust and grant specific
46. 7 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 532-44. See generally O.R. MARSHALL, THE ASSIGNMENT OF
CHOSES IN ACTIoN (1950).
47. D.E.C. Yale, Introduction to 2 LORD NOTTINGHAM'S CHANCERY CASES 89-90 (Selden Soc'y vol.
79, 1961). This idea that the beneficiary's interest in the trust ("equitable title") was an interest in the trust
property and not just a claim against the trustee became the basis for protecting the trust property from the
personal liabilities of the trustee. Lord Chancellor Nottingham clarified the point in the 1670s, and
successor Chancellors confirmed it in 1715 and 1725. Id. at 93.
48. See, e.g., VERNON V. PALMER, THE PATHS TO PRIVITY: THE HISTORY OF THIRD PARTY
BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS AT ENGLISH LAW 87-88 (1992).
49. Common law procedure "was virtually useless" for investigating "matters like secret instructions
given by a feoffor to his feoffees to uses." Fratcher, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, § 10,
at 13; see also 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 418-19.
50. On the origins of the rule, see 2 J.H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 575 (3d ed. 1940); on the abolition
of the rule, see Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualification: An Historical
Survey, 70 KY. LJ. 91 (1981-82).
51. W.T. Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL
AND LEGAL HISTORY 1, 147-49 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1914).
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performance of its terms. 2 Trust enforcement was, therefore, a creature of
equitable procedure.
4. Tracking the Common Law Estates
Because the trust was primarily used as a passive device for holding
ancestral land, it was easy enough to conceptualize the beneficiary's interest
not merely as a personal claim against the trustee, but as a right in the
underlying trust property ("equitable title") that the Chancellor would
specifically enforce against the trustee's bare legal title.
5. Testamentary Trusts
After the barriers to devising real property were overcome in the 1660s,"3
it became quite common to create trusts by will, so-called testamentary trusts.
The testator devised land or other property to persons named in the will, as
trustees to hold for the beneficiaries designated in the will. The testamentary
trust remains common in modern practice. 4
At first glance, contract formation seems a difficult enterprise for a
decedent to conduct. We can understand why, in an age when the contractarian
model itself was primitive,55 contemporaries did not characterize the
testamentary trust as a contract between the decedent and the trustees named
in the will. As a matter of mechanics, since the trust does not arise until the
testator is dead, the trustees may be said to have no one with whom to
contract.
Beneath the mechanics, however, lies the contractarian reality. As I explain
in greater detail at the outset of Part IV of this Article, the defining elements
of the law of contract are consensual formation and consensual terms. The
prototypical transfer by trust agreement from living settlor to trustees exhibits
both attributes. The trustee must voluntarily accept the trusteeship, 6 that is,
agree to serve under the terms of the trust; and those terms are almost wholly
within the parties' autonomy, since virtually all trust law is default law that
can be altered in the trust instrument.
52. E.g., a petition from the 1390s, asking the Chancellor to examine allegedly wrongdoing trustees,
in order to restore the petitioner to "her right in the said lands and tenements, as by the examination before
you, most gracious Lord, shall be found and proved." SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY: 1364-1471, supra note
42, at 48-49.
53. As part of the Restoration settlement, the Statute of Tenures of 1660 abolished the military tenures.
12 Car. 2, ch. 10 (1660). The crown was compensated with alternative revenues-from excise taxes on
beer, cider, and spirits. A.D. HARGREAVES, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF LAND LAW 35 (3d
ed. 1952).
54. Endorsed under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 17(c) (1959).
55. See discussion supra text accompanying note 41.
56. "[Tihe trustee is not under a duty to administer the trust unless he accepts." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 169 cmt. a (1959).
[Vol. 105: 625
Law of Trusts
Both these defining traits persist when a trust is created by will. The
settlor has essentially the same freedom to tailor the terms of the trust under
a will as with an inter vivos trust. Similarly, the persons designated as trustees
have the same right to decline to serve as trustees if the terms are not to their
liking. Accepting a testamentary trusteeship is a consensual act. The
appointment comes from the probate court, standing in, as it were, for the
decedent. The testamentary trustee decides whether to accept the trust on the
terms contained in the instrument and in the background default law of trusts.
The person designated either declines the appointment or agrees to the trust
deal. To be sure, the deal is of the take-it-or-leave-it type, like the movie-
theater ticket or the vending-machine contract; there is no negotiating terms
with a decedent.
Notice in this connection that executorship is a consensual fiduciary
relationship, like trusteeship. You cannot be appointed executor of a will
against your wishes.5 7  Furthermore, the substantive law of estate
administration is mostly default law that the testator's will can alter, apart from
measures designed to protect creditors' rights and other external interests.
Thus, executorship, like trusteeship, exhibits the twin features of
contractarianism-consensual formation and consensual terms. The fiduciary
law applicable to executors is virtually identical to that governing trustees.
C. The Appearance of the Management Trust
The feudal restrictions on the transfer of real property that gave rise to the
conveyancing-type trust disappeared piecemeal from the late seventeenth to the
early twentieth centuries. Although feudal land law no longer needs
evading,58 the trust has endured because it has changed function. The trust
has ceased to be a conveyancing device for holding freehold land and has
become instead a management device for holding financial assets.
The management trust is a response to the radical change away from
family real estate as the dominant form of wealth. As Roscoe Pound observed
in an arresting epigram, "Wealth, in a commercial age, is made up largely of
promises." 59
57. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-301(a)(3), 8 U.L.A. 246 (1990) (application procedures); id.
§ 3-308, 8 U.L.A. 253 (appointment).
58. Indeed, since 1925, statute in England has mandated the trust form for life estates and for
concurrent estates in land. See M.P. THOMPSON, MEGARRY'S MANUAL OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
223 (7th ed. 1993); Ronald Maudsley, Escaping the Tyranny of Common Law Estates, 42 Mo. L. REV. 355,
362-63 (1977).
59. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922).
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1. Financial Assets
Modem wealth takes the form of financial assets-for example, stocks,
bonds, mutual fund shares, insurance and annuity contracts, pension plans, and
bank deposits. 60 The modem trust typically holds a portfolio of these complex
financial assets, which are contract rights against the issuers. This portfolio
requires active and specialized management, in contrast to the conveyancing
trust that merely held ancestral land.
Modern forms of wealth allow the settlor to devolve more options on the
trustee in the dispositive provisions of trusts, that is, in allocating and
distributing beneficial interests. By comparison with the interests possible in
a trust of ancestral land, the modem trust fund invites greater flexibility to
accumulate, distribute, or spend trust funds on behalf of beneficiaries.
2. Institutional Trusteeship
Connected to the change in the nature of trust assets from realty to
financial assets, and in the function of trusteeship from stakeholding to
management, has come a change in the identity of trustees. Trustees of old
were unpaid amateurs, that is, family and community statesmen who lent their
names and their honor to a conveyancing dodge. Still in Maitland's day,
"[a]lmost every well-to-do-man was a trustee .... 61
Private trustees still abound, but the prototypical modem trustee is the fee-
paid professional, whose business is to enter into and carry out trust
agreements. These entities thrive on their expertise in investment management,
trust accounting, taxation, regulation, and fiduciary administration. In the
United States62  these institutional trustees are commonly corporate
fiduciaries,63 that is, profit-seeking enterprises, often listed on the New York
60. The other distinctively modem form of wealth, human capital (that is, skill) does not lend itself
to being a trust or portfolio asset, although trusts to support the education of beneficiaries are common
enough. For discussion of how the growing importance of human capital has altered the patterns of
intergenerational wealth transfer, see John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family
Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988).
61. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in SELECTED ESSAYS 141, 175 (H.D. Hazeltine
et al. eds., 1936). When the German civil code came into effect at the turn of the twentieth century, wrote
Maitland, the English lawyer "would remember how he was a trustee and how almost every man that he
knew was a trustee," and he would wonder why the German code contained no provision for trusts. Id. at
143.
62. In England and the Commonwealth, statutes have facilitated the growth of a Public Trustee system
to supplement private institutions, especially for serving small accounts. The Public Trustee system appears
to have originated in New Zealand. See C.W. VENNELL, A CENTURY OF TRUST: A HISTORY OF THE NEW
ZEALAND PUBLIC TRUST OFFICE: 1873-1973 (1973). Public Trustee legislation was enacted in England in
1906. See Public Trustee Act, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 55 (1906). Canadian jurisdictions have followed. See D.W.M.
WATERS, LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 97-99 (2d ed. 1984). See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra note
28, § 133.
63. The industry's origins are described in JAMES G. SMITH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST
COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1928).
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Stock Exchange and called something like the Wells Fargo Bank or the
Northern Trust Company.
The corporate fiduciary brings to the business of trust administration not
only special skills but also deep pockets. Under the liability regime of trust
law, the trustee places its substantial capital' 4 at risk in the event that the
trustee misperforms its duties. This exposure of the trustee's capital informs
the modem trust deal, effectively insuring the beneficiary against many
potential harms and forming part of what the settlor buys when selecting a
corporate fiduciary. The liability risk creates a further incentive for the trustee
to perform the trust deal faithfully.
Originally, the law of trusts made no provision for compensating trustees
because the gentleman trustee serving as a family stakeholder required no pay.
Legislation was needed to overcome the presumption against trustee
compensation.6 5 For Wells Fargo or Northern Trust, the administration of
trusts is a business, supported by ever more aggressive marketing. Institutional
trustees serve pursuant to a compensation deal, sometimes negotiated for the
particular trust, sometimes based on the bank's published fee schedule, and
sometimes dependent on legislated default law. The hustle of the
marketplace 66 that produces such trusteeships is hard to reconcile with the
doctrinal insistence on denying the contractual character of the settlor-trustee
relationship. Manifestly, these things are deals.
Another virtue of the corporate fiduciary is longevity. Corporate fiduciaries
are institutions of perpetual succession. 67 If I appoint my brother-in-law as the
trustee, I need to arrange for the consequences of his mortality. I need to
designate successor trustees, or design a mechanism for identifying potential
successors, and hope that the persons proposed will agree to serve. By contrast,
when I have cut my trust deal with Northern Trust and the account officer on
the trust dies or leaves, Northern Trust simply shifts the account to another
desk. Northern Trust will outlive my trust, even if the trust runs for a
generation or two.
One measure of the ubiquity of professional trusteeship is the rule, now
widely codified, that the standard of care applicable to a professional trustee
64. The state banking codes that authorize corporations to serve as fiduciaries commonly impose
reserve and capital requirements. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1500-1591 (-Vest 1989 & Supp. 1995).
65. The American state legislation is collected in BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 975.
66. In the trade literature, the marketing of bank trust services is not easily distinguished from vacuum
cleaner sales. The senior vice president for marketing at Boatmen's Trust Company, St. Louis, urges "a
strong incentive compensation program" to reward "the selling efforts of the sales staff." William F.
Ottinger, Making the Case for Trust, BANK MGlr., Nov. 1991, at 37,38. "At Boatmen's, the compensation
program is based on the first year's [trustee] fees. The banker who refers the account receives 20% of the
first year's fees and his department receives 40%. This is in addition to bonuses paid to the trust sales staff
and/or the trust administrators and trust investment managers." Id. at 41.
67. Drafters commonly provide that when a corporate fiduciary merges with another, the survivor shall
be the trustee.
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is the standard of the reasonable professional.68 Another indication that
professional conduct in important trust functions has become the benchmark
of American trust law is the growing pressure on amateur trustees to yield to
professionals. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule
reverses the old rule that forbade trustees to delegate important trust functions.
It imposes a duty on trustees to assess their own competence, in order to
decide "whether, to whom and in what manner to delegate fiduciary authority
in the administration of a trust. ' 69 The Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 1994
strongly accords. 70
A century after Maitland reported that "[a]lmost every well-to-do man was
a trustee,",7 1 institutional trusteeship is ever more the norm.
3. Safeguard: From Disempowerment to Fiduciary Obligation
The trust relationship of necessity puts the beneficiaries of a trust at the
peril of the trustees' misbehavior-for example, if the trustees should
misappropriate or mismanage the trust's assets. The central concern of modem
trust law is to safeguard against those dangers.
The changed character of trust assets has brought about a significant
change in the way trust law protects beneficiaries. An older scheme devoted
to restricting trustees' powers has yielded to the surprisingly modem set of
rules that trust lawyers call the law of fiduciary administration. Although the
substitution of fiduciary law for law restricting the powers of the trustee is a
central event in the development of modern trust law, the scholarly literature
has not, so far as I am aware, noticed it.
In the first centuries of the trust, when trustees were mostly stakeholders
for ancestral land, they were kept tightly in check by being disabled from
doing much with the trust property.7" The default law supplied no trustees'
powers. The trustees had only those powers that the trust instrument expressly
granted, which were typically few, since the trustees' job was simply to hold
and then to convey to the remainderpersons. Stakeholder trustees did not need
to transact. Joseph Story summarized the law for Americans in his treatise on
68. "A trustee who has special skills or expertise, or is named trustee in reliance upon the trustee's
representation that the trustee has special skills or expertise, has a duty to use those special skills or
expertise." UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(f), 7B U.L.A. 20 (1994) (derived from UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 7-302, 8 U.L.A. 555 (1990)); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
69. RFSTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 (1992) (partial revision of
the Second Restatement, promulgated in 1992, and limited to investment and related issues).
70. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9, 7B U.L.A. 26 (1994). I have elsewhere explained the
background of these developments. See John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-
Investment Law, 59 Mo. L. REv. 105 (1994).
71. MAITLAND, supra note 61, at 175.
72. Each trustee was typically one of several co-trustees, and by requiring the trustees to act with
unanimity, the default rule gave each trustee a veto power for superintending the others. The unanimity rule
survives in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 194 (1959).
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Equity Jurisprudence in 1836: "[T]he trustee has no right (unless express
power is given) to change the nature of the estate, as by converting land into
money, or money into land ...."73
Indeed, the modem trustee still needs to look to the trust instrument or to
remedial trustees' powers legislation for empowerment. "In the absence of
legislation, a trustee has no power whatever by virtue of his office; his only
powers are those expressly or impliedly conferred upon him by the terms of
the trust."74
The need for active administration of the modem trust portfolio of
financial assets rendered obsolete this scheme of disempowering the trustee to
transact with the trust property. The modem trustee conducts a program of
investing and managing the assets that requires extensive discretion to respond
to changing market forces.
A strategy of maximum empowerment displaced the former law, initially
in professionally drafted trust instruments, and then in modem systems of
default law such as the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act. These statutes empower
trustees to engage in every conceivable transaction that might wrest market
advantage or enhance the value of trust assets.75
Connected to the movement to empower trustees for active management
of modem trust assets has been the volte face in the rules governing the
responsibilities of persons transacting with trustees and the earmarking of trust
property. Before legislation revolutionized the field, trust law purported to
protect the bona fide purchaser of trust assets, but as a practical matter made
it "very difficult to qualify as a bona fide purchaser.
' 76
The traditional rule, still codified in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,
turns on notice: The purchaser who "has notice that the trustee is committing
a breach of trust in making the transfer"77 is unprotected against the
beneficiaries' claim to recover the trust asset or its proceeds. In tandem with
the earmarking rule, which required a trustee to take title to trust assets "as
73. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA § 978 (Boston, Little & Brown 1836). Story was following Ballow's prominent treatise,
published as 2 JOHN FONBLANQUE, A TREATISE OF EQUITY 170 n.a (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall,
1st ed. 1793).
74. Fratcher, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, § 81, at 66 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186 (1959)).
75. Included are the powers to retain assets; receive additions; operate a business; invest and reinvest;
buy, sell, or lease an asset; exchange, partition, improve, or abandon an asset; exploit minerals; grant
options; vote securities; borrow money; insure; litigate; amortize; and employ agents. UNIF. TRUSTEES'
POWERS ACT §3, 7B U.L.A. 746 (1964).
Corporation law experienced a comparable movement from the restricted corporate powers that
produced the old case law about ultra vires acts, to the modem statutes that grant "corporations legal
powers almost coextensive with those of natural persons ... to engage in any lawful line or lines of
business." ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.1, at 676 (1986) (footnotes omitted). As in trusts, so
in corporations, expanded fiduciary law was the alternate safeguard that replaced restrictions on powers.
76. Fratcher, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, § 98, at 80.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 296 (1959).
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trustee,' 78 anyone purchasing land or securities so titled was effectively
placed on notice to inquire into the trustee's power of sale. Since, however,
trustees had no intrinsic power of sale, these rules required the prospective
purchaser to examine the trust instrument to determine whether it granted the
trustee the power to sell the asset in the pending circumstances. These rules
"effectively deter[red] third parties from dealing with trustees. 79
Statute has now set these disabling rules out of force. Nominee legislation
in every American state has overcome the main earmarking requirement, which
made "it difficult to use corporate stock as a trust investment." 80 Trustees are
now authorized to register trust holdings of corporate stock in a fashion that
conceals the trust interest.8' Furthermore, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, the
Uniform Commercial Code, and the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act provide
that the purchaser is no longer under a duty to inquire into the trustees'
transactional authority merely because the purchaser has notice that the seller
is a fiduciary.82 For example, section 7 of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act
provides that an outsider purchasing or otherwise transacting with trust
property "may [assume] without inquiry" both "the existence of trust power
and their proper exercise by the trustee.'' 83 The modem trustee has been
empowered to transact with trust assets on an equal footing with other market
actors.
Empowering the trustee to transact freely in the financial markets has
shifted the locus of protection for beneficiaries from powers law to fiduciary
law. Whereas disempowerment prevented the trustee from acting, modern
trustees' powers law confers vast managerial discretion. Discretion entails the
risk of harm as well as the opportunity to enhance the trust assets. To
safeguard beneficiaries against abuse of this discretion, trust fiduciary law has
developed as the functional replacement for the former scheme of trustee
disability. Fiduciary law imposes two broad standards, loyalty and care, that
regulate the exercise of the discretion that modem trustees' powers law
bestows.
I discuss the contractarian character of trust fiduciary law below, in Part
IV. The present point is simply that trust fiduciary law bears a modem vintage.
Glance at the classic treatises. Neither Gilbert 4 nor Sanders 5 nor
78. Id. § 179 cmt. d.
79. Peter T. Wendel, Examining the Mystery Behind the Unusually and Inexplicably Broad Provisions
of Section Seven of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act: A Call for Clarification, 56 Mo. L. REv. 25, 31
(1991).
80. Fratcher, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, § 79, at 62.
81. See BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 596; 2A Scorr & FRATCHER, TRUSTS, supra note 3,
§179.5. at 519-25, Fratcher INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, § 79, at 63-64.
82. Wendel, supra note 79, at 32-34, provides detail on the several uniform acts.
83. UNIF. TRUSTEES' POvERS Acr § 7, 7B U.L.A. 758 (1964).
84. GILBERT, supra note 38..
85. SANDERS, supra note 39.
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Fonblanque (Ballow) 86 nor Story87 covers trust fiduciary law. Not until
Lewin 8 (sixteen editions, from 1837 to 1964) in England and Pomeroy89
(five editions, from 1882 to 1941) in America do we find treatises covering
what we now recognize as fiduciary issues, although still in a cramped fashion,
somewhat as an afterthought. The success of the midcentury treatises-Bogert
and Scott-in running Pomeroy off the American market results from their
extensive coverage of the new trust law, that is, of trust fiduciary law.
To be sure, principles of trust fiduciary law can be traced well back to the
eighteenth century. Keech v. Sandford," the foundational case on what we
now generalize as the duty of loyalty, was decided in 1726. The themes of
early trust investment law (the preoccupation with safety of corpus and the
preference for government bonds and well-secured first mortgages) were also
articulated in England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 9 then
remolded into the prudent investor standard across the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries in the United States.92 But these doctrinal impulses were not matters
of great consequence for contemporary practice. Only within the past century
or so, as financial assets displaced ancestral land from the typical trust, have
trustees come routinely to exercise the levels of discretion over trust property
that bring the fiduciary standards of loyalty and care into frequent play. As a
practical matter, trust fiduciary law has been twentieth-century law.
II. PROBING THE OBJECTIONS TO CONTRACTARIAN ANALYSIS OF THE
MODERN TRUST
I return to the question of why the doctrinal tradition of the modem law
of trusts has resisted the contractarian account. The history helps us understand
why the theme of trust as contract was suppressed in the formative era93 of
the trust. But the contractarian account should have become more prominent
in light of the great changes that have occurred in the character and function
of the modem trust. The management trust holds a portfolio of financial assets
86. FONBLANQUE, supra note 73.
87. STORY, supra note 73.
88. I have used Yale's earliest copy: THOMAS LEWIN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES *288-*323 (Philadelphia, John S. Littell 1839).
89. E.g., 2 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §§ 1071-74 (San Francisco, A.L Bancroft & Co., Ist ed. 1882) (investment);
id. §§ 1075-78 (loyalty).
90. 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 741, Cas. Ch. 61, 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (1726). On the origins, see Walter G. Hart,
The Development of the Rule in Keech v. Sandford, 21 LAW Q. REv. 258 (1905).
91. A useful account of the history of the English law appears in A.H. OOSTERHOFF, TRUSTEES'
POWERS OF INVESTMENT: A STUDY PREPARED AT THE DIRECTION OF THE ONTARIO LAW REVIEW
COMMISSION 6-23, 35-44, 49-59 (1970).
92. On the history of trust investment law in the United States, see the important article, Lawrence
M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547,551-72 (1964). See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra
note 28, §§ 613-14.
93. I borrow the phrase. See ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
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that require incessant administration, often including further contracting with
the portfolio assets. The management trust has brought forth a new type of
trustee-the corporate fiduciary, a service provider for hire, hardly different in
function from the professionals who contract to supply services in industry,
commerce, finance, law, accounting, and so forth. Our default law has
undergone a revolution meant to facilitate the management trust. Expansive
trustee powers have liberated the trustee for transacting, while a new fiduciary
law (deeply contractarian, as I discuss in Part IV) has been devised to protect
trust beneficiaries.
Thus the puzzle: Contract suffuses the modem trust relationship in these
many ways, yet our doctrinal account of the trust remains inimical to
recognizing the contractarian basis of the trust. Recall the language of the first
and second Restatements: "The creation of a trust is conceived of as a
conveyance of the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as a
contract.,
94
The resemblance of trust and contract is a topic that was discussed at the
end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. This literature is
not much remembered, in part because the question was framed in an archaic
way, purportedly addressing "the nature of the cestui's interest in the trust." 95
Cestui (short for cestui que trust) is the old term for the beneficiary of a trust.
The central question was whether the beneficiary's interest was proprietary or
"merely" promissory-"whether the beneficiary's interest is an in rem interest
in the trust res itself, or whether the beneficiary has merely an equitable claim
in personam against the trustee."96
The central figures in this dialogue were Frederic W. Maitland, the greatest
scholar of the common law, who got the contractarian basis of the trust right;
and Austin W. Scott, who got it wrong, but had the fortitude to write his error
into the Restatement of Trusts.
Maitland's lectures on Equity dwell on the theme that the trust is a
"bargain" 97 that the Chancellor would enforce, "an obligation, in point of fact
a contract though not usually so called."98 Even though the trust arises upon
the transfer of property to the trustee, the trust
originates in an agreement.... [E]ven if there is no benefit to the
promisor, the trustee, there is at all events detriment to the promisee,
the [settlor], since he parts with legal rights, with property and with
possession. Men ought to fulfil [sic] their promises, their agreements;
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959), previously noticed, supra text
accompanying note 12.
95. See sources cited infra notes 102 and 116.
96. Sarajane Love, Imperfect Gifts as Declarations of Trust: An Unapologetic Anomoly, 67 KY. L.J.
309, 313 n.l (1979).
97. MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 29.
98. Id. at 110.
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and they ought to be compelled to do so.... [T]he Chancellor begins
to enforce a personal right, a jus in personam, not a real right, a jus
in rem-he begins to enforce a right which in truth is a contractual
right, a right created by a promise.
99
Indeed, Maitland thought that no functional justification, but only the imprint
of the historical experience with the conveyancing trust,'t ° could explain our
insensitivity to the contractarian basis of the modern trust. He found it "utterly
impossible for us to frame any definition of a contract which shall not include
the acts by which ninety-nine out of every hundred trusts are created, unless
we have recourse to the expedient of adding to our definition of contract a note
to the effect that the creation of a trust is to be excluded."'01
Why does present-day doctrine embrace an anticontractarian account
dependent upon historical circumstances that no longer pertain? The most
influential effort to resist Maitland's contractarian analysis of the trust was an
article that Scott published in the Columbia Law Review in 1917. Even while
recognizing "that in the creation of a use or trust there are often found all the
elements which are found in the creation of a contract,"'0 2 Scott insisted on
viewing "[tjhe creation of a use or trust... as a legal transaction quite
different from the creation of a contract.
'103
Scott advanced three main arguments in the Columbia paper. He observed
that contract cannot account for the two-party trust-that is, the declaration of
trust, in which the settlor also serves as the trustee.' 4 As was said at the
outset of this Article, when the settlor is the sole trustee, there can be no deal
between settlor and trustee. 5 But that is no answer to the contention that the
conventional three-party trust, centered in the deal between settlor and trustee,
exhibits the contractarian character that Maitland emphasized. (I devote some
further attention to the declaration of trust in the appendix to this Article. I
point out that the declaration sometimes serves as a way station to the creation
of a true third-party trust, and that in other settings the declaration is a label
that is used to validate transfers that are not in function trusts.)
99. Id. at 29.
100. Id. at 110-11.
101. Id. at I1l. Compare Bernard Rudden's observation: "The orthodox explanation, given in terms
of the traditional distinction between law and equity, provides only an historical and not a rational account
of the trust." Bernard Rudden, Things as Things and Things as Wealth, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 81,
89 (1994). Likewise, the concept of legal title in the trustee is a mere historical convention, a way of
speaking. Id. at 88.
102. Austin W. Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 270
(1917) [hereinafter Scott, Rights]; see also Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REv. 539,
540 (1949) (acknowledging "undertaking" as the basis of fiduciary obligation: "Who is a fiduciary? A
fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the interest of another person. It is immaterial whether the
undertaking is in the form of a contract. It is immaterial that the undertaking is gratuitous.")
103. Scott, Rights, supra note 102, at 269.
104. Id. at 270.
105. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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Scott further argued that the English law of contract did not recognize the
third-party-beneficiary contract, the type of contract necessary to enforce trust-
type deals. Scott concluded the Columbia paper with the contention that a
contractarian account of the trust could not explain equitable tracing against
nonparties to the trust deal. By the 1930s, when Scott drafted the Restatement
of Trusts, he was pointing to a further ground: fear that a contractarian account
could undermine the integrity of the trust in the dawning procedural system
that was emerging from the fusion of law and equity. These claims turn out to
be insubstantial.
A. Third-Party-Beneficiary Contracts
The analogy between the conventional three-party trust and the contract
presupposes a system of contract law that recognizes third-party-beneficiary
contracts. Scott began his Columbia article by claiming that "there is a dispute
as to the right of the beneficiary of a contract to enforce the contract."'
0 6
This position was archaic when Scott advanced it. The movement to enforce
third-party-beneficiary contracts was by then deeply entrenched in American
law,"07 although English law still refuses to recognize them.'03
The relation between trust and contract was a central topic in Lawrence v.
Fox,'09 the landmark New York case of 1859 that legitimated the third-party-
beneficiary contract in American law. Justice Gray's opinion reasoned that
trust exemplifies contract, hence that third-party-beneficiary contracts have
long been enforced in trust and might as well also be admitted in contract law.
"The duty of the trustee to pay the [beneficiaries], according to the terms of
the trust, implies his promise to the latter to do so.""0 The principle of
enforcing third-party claims "has been applied to trust cases, not because it
was exclusively applicable to those cases, but because it was a principle of
law, and as such applicable to those cases.""' Thus, enforcing trusts is but
an instance of the larger principle that third-party beneficiaries are entitled to
enforce promises made for their benefit. Indeed, the point has long been made
that trust is the way that the English enforce their third-party-beneficiary
106. Scott, Rights, supra note 102, at 270.
107. The development of American third-party-beneficiary law is brilliantly recounted in Anthony J.
Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109
(1985). Enforcement of third-party-beneficiary contracts in the United States today is firmly settled. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(l) (1981).
108. In his treatise, first published in 1939, Scott was quite critical of the English refusal to enforce
third-party-beneficiary contracts. I ScoTr & FRATCHER, TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 14.4, at 196-200.
109. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).




contracts."12 The precocious development of trust removed the pressure from
English law to recognize the third-party-beneficiary contract.
Accordingly, Scott was right to direct attention to the functional
equivalency of trusts and third-party-beneficiary contracts, but wrong to find
in that relationship any obstacle to the contractarian analysis of the modem
trust. The better view is Lawson's, already quoted, that "the three-cornered
relation of settlor, trustee, and [beneficiary] ... is easily explained in the
modern law in terms of a contract for the benefit of a third party.""' 3
B. Implications of Equitable Tracing
Scott pointed to equitable tracing as the test case for his view that the
beneficiary of a trust is "the equitable owner of the property held by the
trustee" and has "proprietary rights in the trust property... 4 In the case in
which the trustee transferred trust property to an outsider who did not supply
value, the Chancellor would enforce the beneficiary's claim to compel the
transferee to return the asset to the trust even though that transferee was not
a party to the trust deal between settlor and trustee. Scott followed James Barr
Ames in treating equitable tracing against transferees as implementing a policy
to prevent unjust enrichment, but Scott argued that "this reason necessarily
involve[d] a recognition that the [beneficiary] has an interest in the
property."
'" 5
Two issues later in the Columbia Law Review, Harlan Fiske Stone
published a swift reply. He objected that "the real reason for the liability of
third persons is the unconscientious interference with the right in personam
which the [beneficiary] has against the trustee,"'" 6 and not any right in rem
in the trust asset. Stone was showing that the Chancellor's willingness to
enforce the beneficiary's interest against the transferee protects the
beneficiary's (and the settlor's) reliance upon the trustee's promise, and thus
does not need to be conceptualized as vindicating a property right in the trust
asset. The decree runs against the purchaser on account of his conduct, because
he suffers no detriment when he gives no value. The Chancellor's decree
embodies a judgment about how far to impinge on outsiders to the trust deal
112. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 46 LAW Q. REv. 12,
16-17 (1930).
113. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 200. Scott inserted in the Restatement the innocuous black letter
proposition that "[a] contract for the benefit of a third party is not a trust." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 14 (1959). The Restatement is certainly correct to say that not every third-party-beneficiary
contract intends to create a trust relationship, and indeed, most do not. But as Lawson suggests in the
passage quoted in the text, the Restatement provision would be false if subject and predicate were reversed
to say, "a trust is not a contract for the benefit of a third party." It is.
114. Scott, Rights, supra note 102, at 275.
115. Id. at 283.
116. Harlan F. Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REv. 467, 477
(1917).
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between settlor and trustee in order to vindicate that deal. The policies that are
being balanced do not turn on understanding the beneficiary's interest as
property rather than contract.
Stone's colleague, Richard Powell, took Stone's view into his treatise,
Powell on Real Property."7 Powell wrote: "That the beneficiary's interest
has gained protections against a large proportion of possible challengers does
not require treating it as an 'in rem' right enforceable against all the
world."" 8 Powell found American statutory authority on both sides of the
question. For states having no statutory provision, he recommended "[tlhe
traditional and historically sound view," which "is that the beneficiary still has
only a chose in action with supplementing protections against third
persons."l 9
Stone and Powell anticipated the modem jurisprudential consensus against
deducing outcomes by categorizing something as property (or contract). Ernest
Weinrib states it well: "[Piroperty is itself merely the label for that crystallized
bundle of economic interests which the law deems worthy of protection."',2
Accordingly, "affixing the label of property constitutes a conclusion not a
reason. The difficulty is not to supply a label but to identify the protected
interest. ' ' 2 Part IV of this Article shows why the better set of reasons for
enforcing the trust arise from a contractarian analysis.
Once again, it is impossible to side with Scott in thinking that the remedial
system of equity brands the law of trust as anticontractarian. Rather, equitable
tracing is simply a mode of enforcing the trust deal.
C, The Effect of Fusion on Trust Enforcement
By the 1930s, when Scott was embedding anticontractarianism into the
Restatement of Trusts, the themes of his Columbia article had receded before
a new concern. Scott was alarmed over the movement then underway to bring
about the fusion of law and equity in American civil procedure and judicial
administration. He worried that fusion might remove the law of trusts from the
nurturing hand of the specialist equity bench, and indeed, that fusion might
cause trust litigation to be subjected to jury trial. In England and in most
leading American jurisdictions, the law of trusts had been the province of
separate equity courts or equity divisions. Scott used the Restatement to
117. 4 RICHARD POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 513[3], at 41-142 (Patrick I. Rohan ed.,
1995). Powell summarizes "two competing views." One "is that a beneficiary has only a chose in action
along with supplementary protections against interferences by third persons," the other "that the trust
benpficiary owns an equitable right 'in rem' in the trust property." Id.
I18. Id. at 41-145.
119. Id, at 41-149.
120. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 10 (1975); cf. Thomas C.
Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMos 69 (1980).
121. Weinrib, supra note 120, at 11 (footnote omitted).
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reinforce the authority of the specialist equity bench against the imponderables
of fusion.
Recall that the Restatement says: "The creation of a trust is conceived of
as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as
a contract."' 22 Why emphasize conveyancing and disavow contract? The
official comment explains its concern to restrict trust matters to the specialist
equity courts. "[Q]uestions of the administration of trusts have always been
regarded as of a kind which can adequately be dealt with in a suit at equity
rather than in an action at law, where questions of fact would be determined
by a jury and not by the court."'t The trustee's "mere" words of promise
do "not give the common-law courts concurrent jurisdiction over the
administration of the trust,"' 24 and the trustee's "agreeing to perform his
duties as trustee does not make a contract to perform the trust enforceable in
an action at law."'125
Thus, for Scott, having the Restatement deny the contractarian character
of the trust was a means of buttressing the jury-free preserve of equity judges
over trust administration at the historical moment when fusion of law and
equity had the potential to unsettle the ancient jurisdictional patterns. Contrast
agency, that other great repository of fiduciary law, which, having developed
in the common law courts, was not disturbed by fusion. The substantially
contemporaneous Restatement of Agency forthrightly articulates the
contractarian character of the agency relationship.
26
Scott's fear of fusion was probably exaggerated. He was, after all, strongly
predisposed to resist the contractarian account of the trust. But taking his
concern about fusion at face value, experience has shown that the danger is
past. "TIvo generations later, with the place of jury-free equitable jurisdiction
over trusts now secure in our fused civil procedure, t1 7 we can safely
acknowledge the contractarian character of the modern trust. In the next part
of this Article, discussing the functional correspondence of trust and contract,
I point out that contractarian analysis actually reinforces the jury-free character
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959) (carrying forward language from




126. "Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to
act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1.1 (1957) (substantially carrying forward language from
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 1.1 (1933)).
127. Although the overwhelming weight of American authority is that trust disputes are tried to a
judge sitting without ajury, it can still happen that some court misunderstands or misapplies the law/equity
division. For example, in Levinson v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 644 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994),
the court reasoned that since the trust beneficiaries sought damages for breach of trust, and damages are
a characteristic common law remedy, the breach of trust action sounded in law rather than in equity, and
the beneficiaries were entitled to demand jury trial.
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of the trust. Jury waiver is part of the default law of trusts, and is thus
supported through the trust deal.
IV. THE FUNCTIONAL CORRESPONDENCE OF TRUST AND CONTRACT
The contractarian account arises from two fundamental attributes of the
trust. First, what I have been calling the trust deal, the deal between settlor and
trustee that creates the trust, is voluntary. No one can be made to accept a
trusteeship.'28 Thus, the trust, like the contract, is a consensual juridical
relationship. This feature has been present from the formative epoch and is
what led Maitland to see the trust as a species of contract. 29
The other contractarian feature is that virtually all trust law is default
law-rules that the parties can reject. The rules of trust law apply only when
the trust instrument does not supply contrary terms. 30 Because the parties
can oust the trust default regime, we say that they choose it by deciding not
to oust it. The default character of trust law has become more insistent in
modem times, as the trust has lost its connection to the relatively inflexible
patterns of conveyancing, and as trust assets and trust purposes have become
more variable.
These two traits, consensual formation and party autonomy over the terms,
are the defining characteristics of the law of contract.
As in contract, so in trust, the autonomy of the parties is not wholly
unrestrained. There are the obvious public policy prohibitions against trusts for
illegal purposes.t3 ' There are the traditional definitional minima-there must
be trust property and beneficiaries capable of enforcing the trust.
132
Furthermore, any branch of the law of gratuitous transfers requires anti-dead-
hand measures-in trusts, the rule against perpetuities 33 and the implicit
128. "IT]he trustee is not under a duty to administer the trust unless he accepts." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 169 cmt. a (1959). I exclude the constructive trust, a remedial device distinct from
the ordinary law of trusts, see supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164(a) (1959).
131. See id. §§ 60-62.
132. "A trust cannot be created unless there is trust property of such a nature as to be the proper
subject of a trust, and a proper beneficiary." Id. § 66. "A trust cannot be created unless there is trust
property." Id. § 74. A trust is not valid "unless there is a beneficiary who is definitely ascertained at the
time of the creation of the trust or definitely ascertainable within the period of the rule against perpetuities."
Id. § 112.
133. The Uniform Act is the version most widely in force. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES WrrH 1990 AMENDS., 8B U.L.A. 321 (1990). The point is asserted, but on slender authority,
that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to contracts:
Owing to its roots as a means by which to curb remotely vesting future interests that made
property inalienable, especially indestructible executory interests, the Rule Against Perpetuities
is inapplicable to legal relationships that do not create property interests. Contracts-even long
term contracts-are generally exempt. It has been held that optional modes of settlement for the
payment of life insurance proceeds cannot violate the Rule, nor can annuity contracts, even
though future payments may be subject to uncertainties that might not be resolved within a life
in being plus 21 years.
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norm that the trust must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries. 34 There are
also limits on self-serving exculpation clauses in trust 135 that echo the
unconscionability protections in contract. t3 6 Thus, in trust as in contract, the
courts will intervene against market failure. But these limits hardly pinch in
ordinary circumstances, and thus, in virtually any case, the entire terrain of
trust lav is default law.
The typical trust deal consists of a mix of terms, some drafted for the
particular instrument, some taken from the drafter's form books or office
forms, and some supplied by default law. Drafters vary in the propensity to
absorb default law into the trust instrument; some drafters replicate a lot of
default law, others draft only to defeat unwanted default law. Although the
trust deal originates in a contract between settlor and trustee, they seldom
haggle over terms. The trustee is normally indifferent to the distributive
provisions. 37 A corporate trustee will insist on its fee schedule, and it will
insist on acceptable administrative provisions, but drafters know this and
usually oblige in advance. Haggling over terms is not the test for whether
relations are contractual; most contracts involve relatively little haggling. The
LAWRENCE v. WAGGONER E AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 1080 (1991) (citing Doyle v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 377 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1967) and Holmes v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 N.E.2d
909 (N.Y. 1942)). The opposite view seems equally plausible, that the concern to limit dead-hand restraints
ought not to turn on the mechanics of the property/contract distinction.
134. The deviation doctrine, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 (1959), authorizes the court
to direct the trustee to depart from the terms of the trust in circumstances that the settlor had not anticipated
"if necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust." Id. § 167(1). The leading case is In re Pulitzer's Estate,
249 N.YS. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), aff'd mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (Sup. Ct. 1932), in which the trust instrument
forbade the sale of a certain newspaper. The paper became unprofitable, and the trustees sought and
received judicial approval to sell it. I have no doubt that if the trust instrument in Pulitzer had foreseen and
recited the danger that the paper might become unprofitable, and had directed retention of the investment
in any event, the court would nevertheless have directed sale. If the settlor directs an objectively stupid
investment policy, the court will direct deviation even though the settlor anticipates the circumstance. E.g.,
Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 135 A. 555, 564 (Conn. 1926) (voiding certain restrictions limiting the height
of buildings to be erected on trust real estate in part because "the restrictions are opposed to the interests
of the beneficiaries of the trust"). The settlor is presumed to intend to benefit the beneficiaries, but if it can
be shown that a trust term manifestly harms their interests, deviation will be ordered. A private trust must
be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
Observe that garden-variety deviation from trust terms in unforeseen circumstances under Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 167 parallels contract-law relief for impossibility or frustration. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265-66 (1981).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(2) (1959) (stating that exculpation clause "is not
effective to relieve the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or intentionally or with
reckless indifference to the interest of the beneficiary, or of liability for any profit which the trustee has
derived from a breach of trust").
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). Because the trust deal originates in
a gift, a unilateral transfer, the concerns about information cost and market failure that motivate
unconscionability limits on party autonomy for exchange transactions in contract law have less sway in
trusts. However, within the sphere of the trust deal these concerns are present; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 222(3) (1959), for example, refuses to enforce an exculpation clause that has been "inserted
in the trust instrument as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or confidential relationship to
the settlor."
137. Some institutional trustees resist dispositive powers that are highly discretionary, or that impose
on the trustee the responsibility for investigating the needs and financial circumstances of the beneficiaries.
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test for contract, which the trust so easily satisfies, is consensual formation and
consensual terms.'
38
A key distinction between contract and gift is the standard of intention that
governs the transaction. A donative transfer is commonly said to be unilateral,
and accordingly, only the donor's intent, 39 not the donee's, is relevant to
ascertaining the validity and terms of the transfer. In the world of the exchange
transaction, by contrast, the intentions of both parties bear on the creation and
the meaning of their deal.'40 The private trust is a donative transfer, a means
of making a gift. I have emphasized, however, that the gift in trust takes the
form of a deal, between settlor and trustee, about how the trustee will manage
and apply the trust assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries. Which standard
of intention applies, that for gifts or for deals?
The answer is straightforward and turns on the question, which feature of
the trust is in issue? The traditional answer, which is usually correct but
sometimes oversimplified, is that the settlor's intention governs the meaning
of the trust.14 ' The other party to the trust deal, the trustee, is indifferent to
most of the contents of the trust. Fundamental terms that define the purposes
of the trust, such as the choice of beneficiaries and the allocation of shares,
have no effect on the interests of the trustee. Accordingly, only the settlor's
intention governs. However, aspects of the trust deal that touch the interests,
duties, and responsibilities of the trustee are bilateral concerns that import the
contract norm of ascertaining the intentions of both parties. On such matters,
the trustee's reasonable understanding of the deal should be as relevant as the
settlor's.
In the discussion that follows, relating trust to contract, I notice tendencies
toward convergence in aspects of contemporary trust and contract doctrine. I
devote particular attention to the contractarian character of trust fiduciary law.
I observe that the default regime of trust law can be understood as comprising
a type of specialized contract. Acknowledging the contractarian basis of the
law of trusts will sometimes improve outcomes, and I point to some examples.
A. Converging Trends in Contract and Trust Law
Prominent trends in modern contract law are making it ever easier to
account for the trust within the norms of contract. I need refer only briefly to
these developments: (1) the routinization of specific performance; (2) the
138. I continue to exclude the declaration of trust from this account, as explained supra text
accompanying note 5.
139. "The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor's
intention. The donor's intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) requires "mutual assent."
141. "A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 23 (1959); accord, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15,201 (West 1991).
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growing appreciation of relational contracting; and (3) the spread of the good
faith requirement.
1. Specific Performance
For purposes of remedy, the Anglo-American law of contract has
historically straddled the law/equity line. A contract claim sounded in law, but
the specific remedies, in particular, specific performance and injunctive relief,
were only available in equity. Specific relief was called extraordinary and
required a showing that the common law remedy, usually damages, would be
inadequate.'42 Thus, the common law of contract emerged with a strong
emphasis on damages as the presumptive mode of relief. The trust, by contrast,
was the exclusive preserve of Chancery. Specific performance lay routinely
against the trustee (and where needed, against transferees) to enforce the trust
deal.'43
Modem American contract law has undergone a reorientation in its attitude
toward specific relief. The courts have relaxed the requirements for obtaining
specific relief,'" and scholars have made the case for discarding the
automatic preference for relief in damages.145 Accordingly, the remedial
tradition of the trust with its ready facility for specific relief no longer
distinguishes the trust importantly from contract law.
2. Relational Contracting
Classical contract law presupposed the one-shot deal, my money for your
horse. The terms of such a contract can be more easily specified than the terms
of a contract that contemplates a multistage and contingent set of obligations.
A major contribution of the past generation of scholarship in contract law
has been the emphasis on relational contracting, 46 and in particular, on the
142. 1 DOBBS, supra note 27, § 2.5, it 123-48.
143. See RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199(a) (1959). The long association of the trust with
conveyanceing, that is, with the holding and transferring of unique parcels of freehold land, made the routine
grant of specific relief congenial.
144. "Courts have escaped the rule [that specific relief is available only when damages are inadequate]
by defining adequacy in such a way that damages are never an adequate substitute for plaintiff's loss. Thus,
our law embodies a preference for specific relief if plaintiff wants it." Douglas Laycock, The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691 (1990).
145. Damages undercompensate because of the difficulty of monetizing all the harms arising from
breach. See Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). Opinion is more
mixed regarding the availability of specific performance when the cost to the defendant would be
disproportionate to the benefit to the plaintiff. See Laycock, supra note 144, at 749-52; Timothy J. Muris,
Comment, The Costs of Freely Granting Specific Performance, 1982 DUKE LJ. 1053. However, this
situation is unlikely to arise in cases involving enforcement of trusts.
146. A particularly valuable account is Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis
of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992). See also OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 68-84 (1985); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
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special attributes of contracts of long duration. Good examples are "generic
agency relationships, including distributorships, franchises, joint ventures, and
employment contracts."'' 47 Long duration and multistage complexity in a deal
increase the difficulty of contracting with precision. "A contract is relational
to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the
arrangement to well-defined obligations.' ' 4' The inability to specify terms
of the relationship leads the parties to remit important steps to intrinsically
discretionary future determinations, but that discretion risks the potential for
opportunistic behavior. When a dispute arises, the court is asked to engage in
"relational interpretation," for example, in a franchising case, "to identify the
entirety of the commitment structure that underlies the franchise arrangement
and then to enforce those commitments.' 49
Most trusts are well understood as relational contracts. Outside commercial
settings,15 0 a trust for a short-term purpose is rare. The normal trust
contemplates long duration and considerable change of circumstances. Most
trusts are measured in lives, that is, the trust terminates at the end of a
particular life or group of lives. The discretion that is required to manage
modem trust assets and, in some cases, to allocate beneficial shares (for
example, when the instrument gives the trustee a power to invade corpus to
increase a share in case of need) cannot be bounded at the outset of the trust.
The sensitivity to relational contracting is, therefore, another point of




Across the middle decades of the twentieth century, American law came
to recognize a duty of good faith in contracting. The Restatement (Second) of
Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,
72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978).
147. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089,
1091 (1981).
148. Id.
149. Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts,
42 STAN. L. REv. 927, 983 (1990).
150. Which fall outside the themes of this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
151. Goetz and Scott identify various "fiduciary" relations-including those involving attorneys,
executors, and partners-that "are properly analyzed as relational contracts because they tend to be
characterized by uncertainty about factual conditions during performance and an extraordinary degree of
difficulty in describing specifically the desired adaptations to contingencies." Goetz & Scott, supra note
147, at 1127. Add trustees to their list of fiduciary relationships, and the quoted passage would well state
the overlap between relational contracting and trust.
A major theme in the economic analysis of relational contracting is that the sources of incompleteness
in such contracts vary, in ways that affect the appropriateness and character of judicial interpretation. See
Schwartz, supra note 146, at 273-81.
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Contracts now provides: "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.'
' 52
Although expressed as an immutable contract term, the duty of good faith
functions as an intention-implementing standard. Burton's study, emphasizing
New York case law, found that the "courts generally do not use the good faith
performance doctrine to override the agreement of the parties," but "to
effectuate the intentions of the parties, or to protect their reasonable
expectations, through interpretation and implication. ,1 53 Courts use the good
faith norm to regulate performance in cases in which the contract or the
circumstances confer significant discretion on one party. The doctrine restricts
the use of "discretion to recapture opportunities foregone.., on entering the
contract."'154 In the formulation of Easterbrook and Fischel, "The concept of
the duty of good faith like the concept of fiduciary duty is a stab at
approximating the terms the parties would have negotiated had they foreseen
the circumstances that have given rise to their dispute."'
5
The duty of good faith reinforces effective relational contracting, because
it limits opportunistic abuse of discretion in those long-duration or otherwise
multiphased contracts in which significant discretion in performance is
unavoidable. The good faith standard in contract law echoes the norms of trust
fiduciary law, which regulate the trustee's embedded discretion in performing
the trust deal.
B. Trust Fiduciary Law
1. The Duties of Loyalty and Prudence
The law of fiduciary administration, the centerpiece of the modem law of
trusts, resolves into two great principles, the duties of loyalty and prudence.
The duty of loyalty requires the trustee "to administer the trust solely in
the interest of the beneficiary."1 56  This obligation implements the
beneficiaries' entitlement to the trust assets. The trustee owns the assets, but
only to facilitate the beneficiaries' enjoyment. The loyalty norm forbids the
trustee from self-dealing with trust assets and from engaging in conflict-of-
interest transactions adverse to the trust. 57 The harshest application of the
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
153. Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor
Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 499 (1984).
154. Id. at 500.
155. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425,
438 n.28 (1993).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(l) (1959), continued in RSATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 170(1) (1992). The 1992 volume does not republish the official
comments, which remain in force in the 1959 edition.
157. For current treatise discussion, see BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 543; 2A SCOTT &
FRATCHER, TRUSTS, supra note 3, §§ 170-170.25, at 311-437.
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duty of loyalty is prophylactic. The trustee who deals with trust property for
the trustee's own account is liable to disgorge the profits to the trust even if
the trustee paid fair value for the property.'58 By contrast, for liability to
arise from a breach of the requirements of prudent administration or prudent
investing, the trustee's lapse must be shown to have caused harm.
The duty of prudent administration is a reasonableness norm, comparable
to the reasonable person rule of tort.'5 9 An objective standard of care places
the trustee "under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to
exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in
dealing with his own property., 160  Subrules of fiduciary administration
abound-for example, the duties to keep and render accounts, to furnish
information, to invest or preserve trust assets and make them productive, to
enforce and defend claims, to diversify investments, and to minimize costs.
161
All these rules are subsumed under the duties of loyalty and prudence, they are
means of vindicating the beneficial interest. 162
Part II of this Article, explaining the historical transformation of the trust
from a conveyancing device to a vehicle for the active management of
financial assets, pointed to the immense discretion that has come to inhere in
modem trust administration. Trust fiduciary law regulates the trustee's exercise
of that discretion. 163 Be it in trust law or in other fields of fiduciary
obligation (for example, corporations, agency, or partnership), fiduciary duties
are default norms imposed in juridical relations that feature "scope for the
exercise of discretion."' ' 4 Fiduciary duties mean to "induce the fiduciary to
use his power beneficently."'165
158. E.g., Hartman v. Hartle, 122 A. 615 (N.J. Ch. 1923).
159. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act says in its official comment:
The concept of prudence in the judicial opinions and legislation is essentially relational or
comparative. It resembles in this respect the "reasonable person" rule of tort law. A prudent
trustee behaves as other trustees similarly situated would behave. The standard is, therefore,
objective rather than subjective.
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 1, cmt., 7B U.L.A. 16, 19 (1994).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). The prudence norm as applied to investing
and managing the trust assets appears in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE §
227 (1992).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS §§ 172-78, 188 (1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS:
PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(b) (1992).
162. The duty of impartiality, requiring the trustee to act with due regard to the interests of all the
beneficiaries when there are multiple beneficiaries, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232
(1959), is sometimes regarded as a separate norm of fiduciary law coordinate in stature with loyalty and
prudence. In truth, the duty of impartiality is an application of the duty of loyalty. The trustee cannot act
solely in the interest of the beneficiaries as required under the duty of loyalty without taking due regard
of their competing interests. ERISA, the federal pension statute, neglected to codify the duty of impartiality
when it made trust fiduciary law the statutory regime for pension trusts, but the federal courts derived the
duty of impartiality from ERISA's duty of loyalty. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21, at 650.
163. On the sources of trustees' discretion and the appearance of fiduciary law in place of the older
regime of restrictive trustees' powers law, see supra text accompanying notes 72-92.
164. Weinrib, supra note 120, at 4.
165. Id. at 5.
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This combination of broad discretion in the trustee, coupled with fiduciary
norms to protect the beneficiary against abuse of discretion, is a second-best
solution to the problem of enforcing the trust deal. Ideally, as Cooter and
Freedman observe, the deal between settlor and trustee would contain "specific
rules that dictate how the fiduciary should manage the asset in the
beneficiary's best interests. ' 66 Alas, "the fiduciary's obligations are open-
ended. Because asset management necessarily involves risk and uncertainty, the
specific behavior .of the fiduciary cannot be dictated in advance."' 67
Easterbrook and Fischel observe in a similar vein that "the duty of loyalty is
a response to the impossibility of writing contracts completely specifying the
parties' obligations.' 63
A crucial consideration in understanding why trustees, especially expert
professional trustees such as corporate fiduciaries, willingly accept the potential
liability of trust fiduciary law with every trust deal is that compliance with
trust fiduciary law is ordinarily not onerous. The prudent investor rule is
profoundly protective of trustees who have followed common investment-
industry standards. The duty of loyalty, though it threatens draconian
prophylactic liabilities for breach, is also easy enough to obey in ordinary
cases. It says to the trustee, "You are left with the entire universe of
investment possibilities as outlets for your entrepreneurial impulses; you are
required only to stay away from the trust assets when you seek your own
fortune."
2. The Contractarian Basis of Fiduciary Law
Easterbrook and Fischel, emphasizing corporate law, explain why fiduciary
law is contractarian. Their reasoning applies equally to trusts.
When the task is complex, when efforts will span a substantial
time, . . . a detailed contract would be silly. When one party hires the
other's knowledge and expertise, there is not much they can write
down. Instead of specific undertakings, the agent [the manager in
corporations, the trustee in the law of trusts] assumes a duty of loyalty
in pursuit of the objective and a duty of care [prudence in the law of
trusts] in performance .... [T]he process is contractual-because both
principal and agent enter this understanding for gain ....
166. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1991).
167. Id. at 1046-47. Further. "If the parties to this agreement possessed perfect information, disloyalty
could be controlled or prevented by contract. In fiduciary relationships, however, the parties are unable to
foresee the conditions" necessary to spell out the optimum steps by contract. Id. at 1048.
168. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 155, at 426.
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... [A] "fiduciary" relation is a contractual one characterized by
unusually high costs of specification and monitoring. The duty of
loyalty replaces detailed contractual terms .... t69
Loyalty and prudence, the norms of trust fiduciary law, embody the default
regime that the parties to the trust deal would choose as the criteria for
regulating the trustee's behavior in these settings in which it is impractical to
foresee precise circumstances and to specify more exact terms.
The theme that fiduciary law is prevailingly contractarian has not been
much appreciated in trust or other fiduciary law. Two reasons suggest
themselves, the rhetorical tradition of fiduciary law and the somewhat scattered
way in which the contractarian principle has been organized and expressed in
legal doctrine.
Breach of fiduciary duty can be an ugly sight-visualize the widow and
orphans left destitute because the trustee looted the trust fund. Courts naturally
use moralistic language to describe such behavior. Easterbrook and Fischel are
too dismissive when they say, "Fiduciary duties ... have no moral footing;
they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way,
as other contractual undertakings."' 70 Even though fiduciary duties are
contractually assumed, they embody deep moral precepts about the behavior
appropriate for a trustee or other fiduciary. But Easterbrook and Fischel are
quite correct to deprecate the rhetorical excesses of fiduciary law, exemplified
in Cardozo's incessantly cited opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon. 7 ' Courts
sermonize about fiduciary duties without paying adequate attention to the
question of whether and why the particular person is a fiduciary and what
standards the fiduciary relationship imports in the particular circumstances.'72
When an indignant court follows Cardozo and limits its analysis to sounding
off about fiduciary standards being "stricter than the morals of the market
place" and "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,"'173 the court is
neglecting to discuss whether the underlying deal supports the level of
fiduciary obligation that the court invokes.
The other attribute of trust fiduciary law that has tended to conceal its
contractarian character is the scattered way that the contractarian principle has
been articulated in trust doctrine. Contract is there, but not always at first
glance. Turn to the Restatement of Trusts for the formulation of the duty of
169. Id. at 426-27.
170. Id. at 427.
171. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). Posner calls Meinhard v. Salmon "[tihe most famous of Cardozo's
moralistic opinions." RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 104 (1990). At the time
Posner wrote, the case had attracted 653 subsequent citations. Id. at 105.
172. Meinhard v. Salmon was a 4-3 decision about the uncertain responsibilities of joint venturers
following the conclusion of a 20-year lease on a hotel. The dissent construed the deal differently and would
have exonerated the defendant. See 164 N.E. at 551-52 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 546.
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loyalty in section 170(1), and you find no talk of deals. "The trustee is under
a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiary."174 A novice could be excused for thinking that section 170(1)
propounds an immutable rule, a rule that the parties cannot alter. Look again,
however, and the contractarian standard emerges. Comment t propounds the
authorization doctrine, under which the settlor is invited to use the trust
instrument that embodies the trust deal to overturn the duty of loyalty:
By the terms of the trust the trustee may be permitted to sell trust
property to himself individually, or as trustee to purchase property
from himself individually, or to lend to himself money held by him
in trust, or otherwise to deal with the trust property on his own
account. 75
In other words, the duty of loyalty is default law that yields to contrary terms
of the trust deal.
176
Numerous Restatement examples illustrate the prevalence of authorization
over default rules. For example: "A bank or trust company as trustee cannot
properly purchase for the trust its own shares, even though they are purchased
from third persons," but this disloyal transaction is allowed when "expressly
or impliedly authorized by the terms of the trust. '177 The case law also
exhibits this tendency to articulate the duty of loyalty sweepingly, while
voicing more circumspectly or as a defense the authorization doctrine that
remits the scope of the duty to party autonomy. t78 But these are matters of
tone, not substance. Express terms dominate default rules in fiduciary law, as
they do in the rest of trust law.
The authorities reformulating the duty of prudent investing-the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule of 199217 and the
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959).
175. Id. § 170(1) cmt. t (1959). The quoted passage continues: "The trustee violates his duty to the
beneficiary, however, if he acts in bad faith, no matter how broad may be the provisions of the terms of
the trust in conferring power upon him to deal with the trust property on his own account." Id. This proviso
is intent-implementing, forbidding the trustee to invoke nominally permissive language in circumstances
that are outside the purposes of the trust deal.
176. Characteristic decisional authority on the point includes In re Estate of Halas, 568 N.E.2d 170,
178 (III. App. Ct. 1991); In re Krause's Estate, 172 N.W.2d 468, 470-72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Estate
of McCredy, 470 A.2d 585, 596-601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). See generally J.D. Perovich, Annotation,
Validity and Construction of Trust Provision Authorizing Trustee to Purchase Trust Property, 39 A.L.R.3d
836 (1971).
Easterbrook and Fisehel say: "Nothing illustrates the contractual character of fiduciary law better than
one of the cornerstones of trust law: an express provision in the trust instrument governs over the duty of
loyalty in the event of conflict." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 155, at 429 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959), the provision that permits the trust instrument to contain an exculpation
clause).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 170 cmt. n (1959).
178. E.g., Rosencrans v. Fry, 95 A.2d 905, 912-13 (NJ. 1953).
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 228(b) (1992) subjects the trustee
to the duty "to conform to the terms of the trust directing or restricting investments by the trustee," as well
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Uniform Prudent Investor Act of 1994-have been drafted more recently, and
they forthrightly integrate the authorization doctrine into the duty. The Uniform
Act says: "The prudent investor rule, a default rule, may be expanded,
restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust."'"8
Explicit deal trumps default regime.
Another fundamentally contractarian reinforcement for the conventional
duties of loyalty and prudence is the rule that the beneficiary may consent to
trustee behavior that would otherwise breach these duties. 8'
C. Trust as a Standardized Contract
82
Having seen that trusts are deals, and that contract accounts well for trust,
we can view trust default law in functional terms as a type of standardized
contract. The contract terms are well known to transaction planners and
exceptionally easy to invoke.
By calling their deal a trust,183 the parties automatically incorporate an
extensive body of default terms that have proven highly suitable for
implementing deals of this type. The contractarian account views the parties
as choosing this default regime for their particular deal, except to the extent
they modify it.
1. Management Regime
I have emphasized that the modem trust is preeminently a management
device for separating ownership and enjoyment; the trust deal sets the terms
under which the trustee administers and applies the assets.
Unless modified or ousted, several blocks of trust default law define this
relationship. Trustees' powers legislation authorizes transacting, fiduciary law
regulates the purposes and standards of transacting. The default managerial
regime also sets trustee compensation.
On all these matters the default regime impounds the experience of
decades of trust practice, legislation, and case law. The transaction planner
as to any mandatory investment requirements of a governing statute. Section 227(d) makes it explicit that
§ 228(b) overrides the prudent investor norms of § 227. Id. § 227(d).
180. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § l(b), 7B U.L.A. 18 (1994). The official comment says: "Almost
all of the rules of trust law are default rules, that is, rules that the settlor may alter or abrogate. Subsection
[1(b)] carries forward this traditional attribute of trust law." Id. § 1(b) cmt.
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. w, § 216 (1959).
182. Hansmann and Mattei develop in a forthcoming paper the theme that the trust "offers a standard
form" for "contractual relationships." Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and
Economics of Private Trusts 18 (Sept. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Greely relates
the literature on form contracts to aspects of property law in Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities:
The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133 (1989).
183. No words of art are required to invoke the trust regime, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 24(2) (1959), but a competent drafter taking maximum advantage of the efficiency of the trust as
standardized regime does not leave the court to wonder whether a trust was intended.
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who invokes the default regime is spared the difficulty, uncertainty, and
expense of attempting to design afresh a management regime capable of
anticipating the imponderables that the future holds in store for the trust
beneficiaries and the trust assets.
2. Regime for Multiple and Successive Interests
When likening trusts to relational contracts, I observed that trusts
commonly envision relationships of long and uncertain duration, usually
measured in lives. Trusts almost invariably provide for several beneficiaries,
often contingently, often in succession (for example, my widow for life, then
my children, but should any child predecease my widow leaving issue, then the
predeceased child's share to such issue). Trusts can endure for decades,
Trust default law is sensitive to the problems of ascertaining multiple and
successive beneficial interests, and of administering the trust for them. Trust
law absorbs from the underlying property law both the system Of future
interests,' 84 including powers of appointment, and the set of constructional
principles that identify the appropriate shares under class terminology." 5 The
duty of impartiality'86 requires the trustee to give due regard to the interests
of all the beneficiaries. Legislation such as the Uniform Principal and Incomd
Act' "87 applies the duty of impartiality to the quirks of various assets,
allocating receipts and expenses among the several interests. The virtual
representation principle allows the current generation to stand in for
unborns. 88 The rule permitting modification of trusts' 89 in changed
circumstances also responds to the multiplicity and long duration of successive
trust interests; the aspiration is to carry out the trust deal as the parties would
have wanted had they been able to foresee the changed circumstances.
Because human foresight is so limited when projected across future
generations, the trust default regime for these matters is hard to improve upon,
Hence, most drafters prefer to accept most of it rather than attempt to better
it.
184. The law of future interests arose in connection with legal estates, but in modem practice the
competent drafter invariably insists on creating future interests only in trust property, in order that the
managerial prowess of the trust be brought to bear on the coordination problems that can arise with
multiple interests in common property. For a succinct account of the virtues of placing such interests in
trust, see JESSE DuKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 572-75 (5th ed.
1995). In England, the 1925 legislation effectively mandates the trust for such interests. Id. at 575.
185. The modem American law on powers of appointment and class gifts appears in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTrY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 11.1-30.2 (1992).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1959), discussed supra note 162.
187. The current version, UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT, 7B U.L.A. 145 (1962), is being redrafted
by the Uniform Law Commission for projected approval in 1997.
188. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-403, 8 U.L.A. 49 (1990).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 335-36 (1959).
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3. Procedural Regime
The trust default regime also comes equipped with a procedural package
for implementing the trust deal. Trust procedure law may be described as a
three-tier structure. The routine phase is periodic judicial accounting. 90 The
accounting informs the beneficiaries, enabling them to enforce their rights. The
accounting also provides closure for trustees on current installments of these
long-duration undertakings. Because, however, judicial accountings can be
costly and clumsy, drafters sometimes prefer to alter the default regime in
favor of nonjudicial accountings.' 9'
The second procedural level, for situations of uncertainty or dispute, is
judicial instruction. The trust tradition has been precocious in allowing the
parties, typically the trustee, early resort to authoritative judicial guidance.' 92
Finally, if litigation arises, it is tried to the judge, sitting without a jury.
There is nothing novel in contracts that expressly design procedural
measures, for example, forum selection clauses or arbitration clauses, or
clauses that waive jury trial. From the contractarian perspective we understand
the attractive procedural package of the trust default regime as a set of
measures that the parties to the trust deal (the settlor and the trustee) elect
when they couch their deal as trust.
Recall Scott's concern that acknowledging the contractarian basis of the
law of trusts might undercut the traditional preference for nonjury trial of trust
litigation, since jury trial is the default norm for ordinary contracts. 93 In
truth, the contractarian account of the trust reinforces the nonjury tradition of
the trust, by treating the trust as a type of specialized contract in which the
parties presumptively agree upon nonjury adjudication as the default term. Far
from undercutting the traditional preference for nonjury trial in trust matters,
the contractarian account of the trust strengthens that preference by recognizing
the parties' autonomy to prefer it for their deal.
Certain distinctive remedial devices should also be seen as belonging to
the procedural regime of the trust, including the court's powers to remove a
trustee for cause 94 and to reduce or deny compensation to a trustee who
breaches the trust. 95
190. Id. § 172 (1959).
191. See David Westfall, Nonjudicial Settlements of Trustees' Accounts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1957).
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 259 (1959); BOGERT, TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 559.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
194. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 cmts. a, b (1959).
195. Id. § 243.
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4. Statutory Trusts
Another indication that the trust has something of the function of a
standardized-type contract is the easy tendency for lawmakers to mandate the
trust in a variety of settings in which certain of its attributes-typically the
separation of management from enjoyment and the fiduciary regime for
controlling managerial discretion-make the trust form a convenient solution
to some perceived problem. Examples range from such public law devices as
the Social Security trust funds 96 and state workers' compensation trust
funds'97 to the regulatory systems that require union-dominated employee
benefit funds' 98 and private pension plans'99 to utilize the trust form. Like
the standardized contract that the drafter pulls down from the shelf of form
books, the trust is a ready regime for the legislator to invoke when dealing
with the recurrent and intrinsically risky situation of managers having
discretion over somebody else's money.20Q
D. Altering Outcomes
Because contract is simply an alternative doctrinal rubric for describing
what our law achieves with the trust, the outcomes under contractarian analysis
ought not to differ in most respects from those already current in trust law.
The principal gain is candor. There are, however, some problem spots in the
law of trusts, places in which greater attention to the contractarian basis of the
trust should affect outcomes. The contractarian premise is that the law should
196. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1991).
197. See BOGERr, TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 246.
198. Taft-Hartley Act § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988).
199. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988).
200. I have elsewhere pointed out, speaking of ERISA, that these transferred usages of the trust can
be problematic when the statutory design neglects to adjust for the differences between a trust deal that
implements a gratuitous transfer and a trust deal that is part of an exchange transaction.
The insight that ERISA's drafters failed to capture in their fiduciary law is that in the ERISA
pension trust the nominal trust beneficiaries (that is, the plan participants and their beneficiaries)
are seldom at risk [because the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) guarantees most
defined benefit pension promises, with full recourse against the employer]; accordingly, the
fiduciary rules should have been more concerned to protect the employer's stockholders and the
PBGC than the plan participants.
John H. Langbein, The Conundrum of Fiduciary Investing under ERISA, in PROXY VOTING OF PENSION
PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES 128, 133 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1989) (Pension Research Council, Wharton
School). This theme is developed in Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105 (1988).
For regulatory reasons ERISA greatly limits the parties' autonomy to contract around ERISA fiduciary
law. The Supreme Court has construed ERISA § 404(a)(l)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (1988), to mean
"that trust documents cannot excuse trustees from their duties under ERISA." Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 568 (1985). Despite this provision,
the courts have recognized an important sphere for contractual autonomy by identifying certain intrinsic
"business" or "settlor" functions that the courts treat as falling outside the reach of ERISA's mandatory
fiduciary law. These include the powers to offer, enrich, or terminate an ERISA-covered plan. See
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 21, at 635-36, 819-20, 897.
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strive to implement the trust deal, the deal between settlor and trustee. I offer
two examples of situations in which traditional trust law has not given enough
weight to the deal.
1. Standing: Settlor Enforcement
The present default rule governing standing to enforce a trust excludes the
settlor. In the words of the second Restatement, only the "beneficiary or one
suing on his behalf can maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce the
trust."' t The official comment to the Restatement observes revealingly that
contract could reverse this rule:
[I]f the settlor makes a contract with the trustee, he can maintain an
action on the contract against the trustee. The trustee, however,
merely by accepting the trust and agreeing to perform his duties as
trustee does not make a contract with the settlor to perform the trust
which the settlor could enforce.2°2
Starting from its recurrent false premise that trusts are not contracts, the
Restatement concludes in this passage that a separate contract beyond the trust
would be needed to create a power in the settlor to enforce the trust. The trust
default regime has no room for settlor enforcement, the Restatement reasons,
because the settlor of a trust retains no right in the trust property.2 3 We see,
therefore, that the Restatement rule rests on the familiar tautology. Since trust
is a property relationship, the settlor who no longer owns the property cannot
enforce the trust.
Admit the contractarian basis of the trust, however, and the case for
reversing the default rule has been opened. The proper question becomes:
What was the intention of the parties to the trust deal respecting this point, and
if they did not articulate their intention on this matter, which default rule
captures the likely bargain they would have struck had they thought about it?
When such an intention-seeking standard is applied, as it is, for example, to
third-party-beneficiary contracts, the parties are routinely assumed to have
intended enforcement by the promisee (the settlor-equivalent person) as well
as the beneficiary.2' 4
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 (1959). Case law is collected in 3 SCOTT &
FRATCHER, Tgurrs, supra note 3. § 200.1, at 211-12 n.2. See also Note, Right ofa Settlor to Enforce a
Private Trust, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1370 (1949) (criticizing rule of nonenforcement on contractarian grounds).
But see John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law Setting, 62 N.C.
L. REV. 905, 911 (1984) (expressing distrust of contractarian analysis because of difficulty of ascertaining
"when the underlying contract exists").
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. b (1959).
203. "Where, however, the settlor retains an interest in the trust property, he can of course maintain
a suit against the trustee to protect that interest." Id.
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 305, 307 (1981).
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2. Embedded Conflicts of Interest
Greater sensitivity to the expectations of the parties to the trust deal can
protect the legitimate interests of the trustee as well as those of the settlor. I
take as my example the duty of loyalty, which, it will be recalled, forbids the
trustee both from self-dealing with trust property and from conflict-of-interest
transactions in which the trustee derives personal advantage from managing the
trust property.205 We have seen why the duty of loyalty is a presumptively
contractarian norm, embodying a prophylactic rule that can fairly be imputed
as the default regime that the parties would have chosen had they thought
about it. We have seen that, although the duty of loyalty is harsh-a penal
deterrent rule that imposes liability even when loss has not
resulted-compliance with the prohibition against self-dealing is ordinarily not
burdensome, because the trustee is forbidden only one tiny sliver of the world
of investment opportunities, namely, the assets in the trust.
The duty of loyalty works smoothly enough in garden-variety self-dealing
situations. Trustees stand well warned, and they virtually always obey the rule
against self-dealing. When, however, a trustee is discovered to have yielded to
the temptation to buy a trust asset or to sell a personal asset to the trust, the
liability arises and disgorgement of gain follows. In "mere" conflict-of-interest
settings, by contrast, the duty of loyalty has not been such an unambiguous
success story. The rule is overbroad, especially in situations involving personal
as opposed to institutional trustees. Conflicts of interest are sometimes
embedded in the very relationship that induces the settlor to ask the particular
individual to serve as trustee.
Consider the leading American case, In re Rothko206 (which involved
executors207 rather than trustees). The New York Court of Appeals held that
two of three coexecutors whom Mark Rothko selected to administer his estate
had a conflict of interest in the transactions by which the estate sold Rothko's
paintings to the Marlborough Gallery.28 One of the executors, Reis, was a
director of the Marlborough. Another executor, Stamos, was an artist whom
Marlborough represented. After the prices of Rothko paintings appreciated
dramatically, the courts imposed draconian liabilities for the supposed shortfall
upon the two fiduciaries, assertedly on account of their conflicts of
interest.
209
205. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
206. 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
207. See supra text accompanying note 57 for discussion of correspondence of trusteeship and
executorship.
208. Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 296.
209. Id. at 298, 300.
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Richard Wellman has criticized this dimension of Rothko in a prominent
article. 0 He observed that Mark Rothko personally selected Marlborough
as the gallery through which he sold his paintings during his lifetime.2" '
Wellman further noted, "Rothko knew that Reis and Stamos had personal ties
to the gallery. These facts suggest that Rothko wanted his executors to deal
with the gallery.
' 212
The factors that Wellman addressed and that the New York Court of
Appeals disregarded are essentially contractarian. What was the logic of the
parties' deal? Did the two executors provoke a disloyal conflict, or did they
pursue a course of action that Rothko tacitly authorized when he selected
fiduciaries who came with an embedded conflict? At this distance from the
litigation, these questions that the court did not ventilate are hard to answer.
If, however, the contractarian basis of the trust deal (in this case, an estate
deal) were understood, questions of this sort would be properly posed and
investigated. Family and personal trustees often have interests adverse to the
trust. The settlor's determination to ask these conflicted persons to serve bears
materially on the standard of fiduciary duty that the trust deal embodies.
Readers familiar with the modem English law will see that contractarian
analysis would bear on the leading case of Boardman v. Phipps,21 which has
caused much disquiet. The trust owned a block of just over a quarter of the
shares of what Americans would call a close corporation. The defendants, a
trustee and an entrepreneur, developed a plan to reorganize the firm and
enhance shareholder values. The trust declined to buy the additional shares
needed to make the scheme work. Using information acquired while
representing the trust, the defendants bought additional shares for themselves
to force the reorganization. The plan succeeded, and the value of the trust's
shares increased substantially. The defendants profited on the shares that they
had purchased for themselves to make the plan work. A divided House of
Lords held the defendants liable to disgorge to the trust their profit on these
personally acquired shares, although the court allowed the defendants liberal
compensation for their services.
Using the hypothetical bargain analysis of contract, the question is
whether, had the settlor anticipated the opportunity to make the trust better off
by allowing the fiduciaries to become co-venturers in such a situation, he
would have authorized the step. Manifestly, the well-counselled fiduciary
210. Richard V. Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries-Is Rothko Right?, 77
MICH. L. REv. 95 (1978).
211. See id. at 114 n.68.
212. Id. at 113. Wellman also pointed out that Reis's financial gain as a Marlborough director was
trivial. Id. at 113 n.67. Further, "much of... [Marlborough's profit on reselling the Rothko paintings] was
generated by the gallery's vigorous promotion and by publicity from the litigation." Id. at 114.
213. Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 App. Cas. 46 (H.L.), aff'g Phipps v. Boardman, [1965] Ch. 992.
For a succinct account of the facts and the opinions, see Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the
Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAWV Q. REv. 472, 481-86 (1968).
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situated as were the defendants in Boardman v. Phipps should seek judicial
instruction in advance of engaging in a conflict-tainted transaction. But
amateurs are not always alert to the wisdom of that step. Indeed, in Rothko the
executors were mistakenly advised by counsel that advance judicial instruction
would not have been available.214
The prophylactic duty of loyalty presses too harshly on trustees and
comparable fiduciaries in settings such as Rothko and Boardman v. Phipps.
Low-grade conflicts of interest are especially endemic in family trusteeships.
We see constantly in real-world practice some version of the case in which my
father names me trustee for my mother for life, remainder to a group including
me, with a power in the trustee to invade the corpus of the trust for the benefit
of my mother in the event the life interest becomes inadequate for her comfort
and support. My father has insisted on choosing a conflict-tainted trustee,
making the judgment that I am to be trusted not to pauperize my mother to
enrich myself. These situations are especially dangerous when the trust is given
a controlling interest in a close corporation, and I am an officer of that firm.
If he is well counseled, my father spells out broad authority for me as trustee,
expressly trumping the default standards of the duty of loyalty. But when he
neglects that step, contractarian analysis encourages us to look at the real
nature of the trust deal, that is, what he and I understood, or what we would
have understood about the purposes of the trust and the standard for my
trusteeship. The standard is not the same as when my father places a portfolio
of fungible financial assets in trust with Wells Fargo or Northern Trust.
E. Trustee Insolvency
I turn from the strengths of the contractarian analysis of the trust in
accounting for trust fiduciary law to the weak point of contractarian analysis:
the law of trustee insolvency, which governs the rights of outsiders to the trust
deal. The handling of trustee insolvency is the feature of the modem trust that
resonates most strongly in the property tradition. The Restatement version of
the rule is that, "[a]lthough a trustee becomes insolvent or bankrupt, the
beneficiary retains his interest in the subject matter of the trust if it can be
identified... [or traced], and is entitled thereto as against the general creditors
of the trustee., 215 Because trustee insolvency is not a common phenomenon,
the subject is not much emphasized in the indigenous tradition of the law of
trusts.21 6 It is striking, therefore, to discover how central this topic is in the
comparative law literature. Europeans, who lack the trust, regard the law of
214. In re Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 936-37 (Sur. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUsTS § 12 Cmt. f (1959).
216. For example, the leading law school course book, DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 184,
gives it no mention.
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trustee insolvency as a defining element of the Anglo-American trust,"' and
they find this feature of the trust perhaps the hardest to replicate in purely
contractual arrangements.
The property rubric supplies the conventional explanation for the treatment
of trustee insolvency in our law of trusts. The Restatement says: "The
beneficiary of a trust has the beneficial interest in the trust property," whereas
a creditor of the trustee "has merely a personal claim against the debtor." ' 8
If you hold property for me under contract, it is said, I am your creditor, and
thus I am at risk of your insolvency along with your other creditors. But that
is only the starting point. Techniques of contract can approximate the trust
outcome: Security interests suffice in some instances to protect the creditor's
interest in an asset; the contract of agency sometimes leaves title in the
beneficial owner while an agent manages; and the corporate form can be
employed to defeat creditors. F.H. Lawson, explaining how the Europeans can
approximate the trust, remarked: "What is a modem limited company.., but
a device for limiting the access of creditors to a single fund? The interpolation
of a fictitious person in the form of a company should not deceive
anyone."219
An excellent example in our own law of a contractually based device that
replicates the regime for protecting beneficiaries in the case of trustee
insolvency is the life insurance company's separate account. Such accounts are
authorized by statute in the main insurance states. The Connecticut legislation,
for example, provides that: (1) the insurer may establish a separate account for
a particular group of insurance or annuity policies; (2) the insurer may credit
to the separate account the gains and losses on the assets allocated to that
account "without regard to other income, gains or losses of the company"; but
(3) "to the extent.., provided under the applicable contracts," that is, under
the separate-account insurance or annuity policies, the separate-account assets
"shall not be chargeable with liabilities arising out of any other business the
company may conduct." 0 The statute emphasizes that this arrangement
sounds in contract, not trust. The separate-account assets are "owned by the
217. The 1984 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition (Hague
Convention) exemplifies this perception. Article 11 provides that recognition of a trust implies "that
personal creditors of the trustee shall have no recourse against the trust assets" and "that the trust assets
shall not form part of the trustee's estate upon his insolvency or bankruptcy." 2 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION: TRUSTS-APPLICABLE LAW AND
RECOGNITION 361, 363-64 (1985) [hereinafter HAGUE CONFERENCE]. The Hague Convention is reprinted
in 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 595 (1986).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 12 cmt. a (1959).
219. LAWSON, supra note 10, at 200.
220. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-433(a) (West 1992); see id. § 38a-459 (authorizing such separate
accounts for employee benefit plans); id. § 38a-944(b) (reiterating that separate account is not chargeable
with liabilities arising from insurer's general account or its other separate accounts). In Rohm & Hass Co.
v. Continental Assurance Co., 374 N.E.2d 727,732-33 (I11. App. Ct. 1978), the court sustained comparable
Illinois legislation insulating insurance company separate accounts from unrelated liabilities of the insurer.
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company, and the company shall not be, nor hold itself out to be, a trustee
with respect to such amounts."22'
Whether, as a general matter, the protection against trustee insolvency that
is characteristic of an ordinary trust fund could successfully be rested on such
contract devices, it is certainly true that the ease of conceptualizing the trust
fund as the beneficiaries' property has thus far largely spared us the need to
try. I would be content to rest even the rule for trustee insolvency on the
transactional law: Trust is a type of deal that prefers the trust beneficiaries
over the personal creditors of the manager. But the traditional, property-based
account is easy to reconcile with the contractarian account: Trust is a hybrid
of contract and property, and acknowledging contractarian elements does not
require disregarding property components whose convenience abides.
V. LESSONS FROM NONTRUST LEGAL SYSTEMS
I conclude this Article with the briefest glance in the direction of
comparative law. I wish to leave my readers with three points that, although
undoubted in the literature of comparative law, are sometimes unfamiliar to
trust lawyers. First, the trust is a uniquely Anglo-American institution. The
Continental legal tradition did not develop the trust. Second, when we ask how
the Europeans function without the trust, we find that they achieve mostly by
means of contract what the Anglo-American systems do through trust. Third,
when a transaction with multistate dimensions causes one of these nontrust
legal systems to confront the Anglo-American trust, the European courts
analogize trust mostly to contract. The easy correspondence of trust and
contract in European law is further indication of how close in function the trust
lies to contract in our own law.
The relations between trust and nontrust jurisdictions were intensively
studied in the preparations that led to the 1984 Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Trusts and Their Recognition.222 The Hague Convention's
221. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-433(a)(v) (West 1992). This negation of trust spares insurance
companies from having to comply with the regulatory regime for trust companies.
222. The Hague Convention is mainly designed to facilitate recognition of the authority of a trustee
who needs to act in a nontrust jurisdiction. The Convention avoids defining a trust, calling it the
relationship that results "when assets have been placed under the control of a trustee." 2 HAGUE
CONFERENCE, supra note 217, at 362 (Hague Convention Art. 2). The treaty isolates three characteristics
of the trust that it treats as definitional: that "the assets constitute a separate trust fund and are not a part
of the trustee's own estate"; that the trustee has legal title to the trust assets; and that the trustee has the
power and duty to manage the assets "in accordance with the terms of the trust and the special duties
imposed upon him by law." 2 id. This last element is what I have been calling the trust deal, as evidenced
in the instrument and in the default regime.
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official report explains that "the laws of many countries simply do not have
a category labelled 'trusts.', 223 Instead,
the parties to a contract in civil law... [may create] contractual
obligations which bear a certain resemblance to trust
arrangements.... [B]y a combination of [the Roman-derived contract
types called] deposit and mandate some of the purposes may be
achieved for which trusts are created; the resemblance is even stronger
when the combination includes a contract for the benefit of a third
party.
224
The Hague Convention report observes that the analogy from Anglo-American
trust to Continental contract "is only partial" because the Continental
arrangement is "of a purely contractual nature," and accordingly, "the
depositary or mandatee is not given any proprietary rights with respect to the
property.' '2" Although the Continental alternatives do not precisely replicate
the trust, these "and similar contractual arrangements are quite successfully and
extensively used in civil law systems. 226
When the Europeans confront a trust in judicial practice, they tend to treat
it as a contract. The Hague Convention report discusses leading cases from
Luxembourg (1971), France (1970), and Switzerland (1970), in which conflict-
of-laws issues about trust validity were resolved by characterizing the Anglo-
American trust in terms of the forum state's law of contractual obligations.227
For example, in Harrison v. Cr6dit Suisse,228 an Englishman attempted to
create a trust in Zurich. The Swiss court reasoned: "'As there exists in Swiss
law no legal institution which corresponds in all its elements to the legal
relationship created by the ... [attempted trust], it is necessary to examine
which legal institutions of Swiss law ... [have] the closest resemblance.'
' 229
Applying this method, the court determined that the trust had "certain elements
of a contract of mandate, of a fiduciary transfer of property, of donation and
of a contract for the benefit of a third party."' O The Hague Report
concludes: "[T]he mainstream in the civil law characterization of the trust...
223. Adair Dyer & Hans van Loon, Report on Trusts and Analogous Institutions, in 2 HAGUE
CONFERENCE, supra note 217, at 10, 11. The Report contains an extensive bibliography that collects much
of the comparative law writing about the trust. Id. at 103-08.
224. Id. at 36.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 78-80. The Luxembourg case involved "a trust indenture for an issue of Eurobonds"; the
court "characterized the Trust Indenture as a contract, in this case a contract of mandate," but concluded
that "the trust did not stand up under the applicable law." Id. at 79.
228. Judgment of Jan. 29, 1970, ATF In, 96 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes 79
(Switz.).




emphasizes its flexibility and sees it as a contract-like institution ....,3 In
Europe, contract does the work of trust.
a2
I do not mean to imply that the Europeans function as well without the
trust as they would with it. They do not. No European legal system has a
planning tool for multigenerational wealth transfer that can rival a well-
designed Anglo-American estate plan, which combines the managerial
strengths of the trust with the flexibility that our property law permits through
future interests and powers of appointment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In articulating the contractarian vision of the trust, it has been reassuring
to find powerful support in quite diverse literatures. The historical work of
Maitland points squarely to the contractarian account. We find the
contractarian account implied in the doctrinal writing of Harlan Fiske Stone
and Powell, the writers who refuted Scott; in the modem law-and-economics
literature, notably Easterbrook and Fischel; and in comparative law.
I said at the outset of this Article that it was not my wish to fold the law
of trusts into the law of contracts. Maitland was surely right to speak of the
trust as perhaps "the most distinctive achievement ' 233 of the Anglo-American
legal tradition. The trust straddles our categories of property and contract,
because it embodies a contract about how property is to be deployed. What is
special about the trust is the deal that subjects that property to the trust
management regime.
My purpose in emphasizing the contractarian basis of the trust is to
account for the trust more accurately, and, at the margin, to improve some
mistaken results that the law reaches when contract notions are too
subordinated. The conventional account of the trust that we find in the second
Restatement and in the treatises simply does not give due weight to the
bedrock elements of contractarian principle that inform the norms of trust law,
namely, consensual formation and consensual terms. Trusts are deals.
231. Dyer & van Loon, supra note 224, at 81.
232. This, too, is an insight that traces squarely to Maitland. He paused in the lectures on Equity to
reflect on the uniqueness of the trust, which he thought was "perhaps ... the most distinctive achievement
of English lawyers. It seems to us almost essential to civilization, and yet there is nothing quite like it in
foreign law." MArTLAND, supra note 7, at 23. The want of trust, Maitland said, seems to the English lawyer
"a big hole" in Continental law. Id The Europeans reply
that, instead of a big hole, civil law offers a bouquet of institutions which either alone or in
combination fulfil most if not all of the functions of a trust. By instituting an independent
juristic entity (a corporation or foundation), by setting up a contractual network of relationships,
by transferring proprietary rights, by certain testamentary dispositions, and, most often, by a
combination of two or more of these legal devices, it is possible to arrive at results which are
very similar to those which common law systems have achieved through the trust.
Id. (cited in Dyer & van Loon, supra note 223, at 40).
233. MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 23.
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APPENDIX: THE DECLARATION OF TRUST
The text of this Article is devoted to the three-party trust relationship, in
which the owner of the property (settlor) transfers it to a separate trustee for
the benefit of the beneficiary. There is, however, another mode of creating an
express trust that dispenses with the third-party trustee, the so-called
declaration of trust. The settlor declares that he or she now holds the property
as trustee for the beneficiary.24 The settlor remains the legal owner, but the
declaration is treated as having transferred the beneficial interest to the
beneficiary. "[Flor the last hundred years," Scott wrote, "it has been held that
a trust may be created by a gratuitous declaration of trust." Enforcing such a
trust shows that "the courts regard the transaction as a transfer of a beneficial
interest rather than as the creation of an obligation. 235
Scott is correct that the declaration of trust cannot be squared with the
contractarian account of the trust, which finds the basis of the trust obligation
in the trustee's promise to the settlor to hold the trust assets for the benefit of
the beneficiary. In the declaration-of-trust setting, the settlor is also the trustee
and cannot contract with himself or herself. There is no trust deal, even though
there is a valid trust. Accordingly, as was said at the outset of this Article, our
law now permits trust obligations to arise apart from contract, when the settlor
imposes those obligations upon himself or herself without making use of an
intermediary. Because this arrangement does not achieve what most modem
transferors want from a trust, namely, the management services of the third-
party trustee, we would expect it to be little used.
When we observe how the declaration of trust is actually employed, we
find that it usually results in one of three outcomes:
(1) The declaration functions as a nonprobate will that produces a one-
time wealth transfer upon the death of the transferor, with no continuing
trust relationship.
(2) The declaration functions as a curative doctrine to excuse
noncompliance with the delivery requirement of the law of gifts, again
producing a completed transfer with no continuing trust relationship.
(3) The declaration ripens on the transferor's death into a conventional
three-party trust fully consonant with the contractarian model advanced in
this Article.
In short, most usages of the declaration of trust are either nontrusts or way
stations to real third-party-trustee trusts.
234. "A trust may be created by ... a declaration by the owner of property that he holds it as trustee
for another person ...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 17(a) (1959).
235. Scott, Rights, supra note 102, at 270 (citing Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140, 34 Eng. Rep. 271 (Ch.
1811), discussed in Gregory S. Alexander, The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category 1800-1914,
5 LAW & HiSr. REv. 303, 327-32 (1987)).
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A. The Declaration of Trust as Nonprobate Will
The best-known usage that passes under the name of the declaration of
trust is the Dacey 6 (or Farkas 7) trust, which is simply a form of words
used to achieve a nonprobate transfer on death. The Dacey trust is a will
substitute, a nonprobate will,238 and heavily promoted as such.23 9 The
purported settlor creates a revocable trust, declaring herself trustee for herself
as beneficiary for life, with remainders to the persons who are in function the
devisees. During the settlor's lifetime his or her dominion over the
property-that is, over the nominal trust assets-remains total. On the settlor's
death, if the settlor has left the arrangement unrevoked, it functions to transfer
the property to the nominal remainder beneficiaries outside of probate (hence
Dacey's jubilant book title, How to Avoid Probate240). These
remainderpersons had during the settlor's lifetime precisely that bare
expectancy that characterizes the interest of a devisee under the will of a living
testator.
Pressured by popular discontent with probate, American law resolved to
allow the nonprobate will, and to allow the transferor to manipulate the
language of trust to achieve it, but analytically the nonprobate will effected by
means of the declaration of trust should not be confused with the trust. The
settlor/trustee operating a Dacey trust owes no enforceable fiduciary duties to
the nominal beneficiaries during the lifetime of the settlor/trustee."4t On his
death, the so-called trust terminates, and the beneficiaries take the property
outright. The trust label is simply being borrowed to legitimate probate
avoidance.
B. The Declaration of Trust as Curative for Failed Inter Vivos Gift
We also find the declaration of trust employed as a curative device for
failed inter vivos gifts, although such cases are relatively uncommon. The
236. NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW'TO AvOID PROBATE (1965). On the popular success of Dacey's book,
see DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 184, at 352-53.
237. Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955), is the leading case sustaining such a trust against
the contention that, because it functions as a will but lacks Wills Act formality, it is void for violation of
the Wills Act.
238. On the concept, see John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and The Future of the Law
of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1140-41 (1984).
239. Financial intermediaries competing against each other to sell investment products have promoted
the declaration of trust. The Minneapolis-based mutual fund organization, Investor's Diversified Services,
now a subsidiary of American Express, devised the form of declaration contested in Farkas. Norman Dacey
was a mutual fund salesman who claimed to be "free[ing] Americans from the bondage of the iniquitous
probate system." DACEY, supra note 236, back cover.
240. DACEY, supra note 236.
241. See Langbein, supra note 238, at 1126-29 (explaining why Farkas trust fails its own purported
"present interest" test).
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intending donor neglected to comply with the delivery requirement142 and is
now unable to deliver, usually because the donor has since died.243 Delivery
is a formality meant to distinguish between the case in which the transferor
was serious about his donative purpose, and the case in which he was babbling
idle chatter. When the court treats such a transferor as having uttered a
declaration of trust, the transfer is enforced without the transferor having
delivered the property. In such a case, the declaration of trust functions to
dispense with the delivery requirement of the law of gifts, hence to evade the
rule that our law does not enforce a mere promise to make a gift.
Using the declaration of trust to dispense with gift-law formality reminds
us of Dacey's use of the declaration of trust to evade compliance with Wills
Act formality. In each instance the declaration-of-trust label legitimates a one-
shot transfer, as opposed to the long-duration regime of divided management
and enjoyment that characterizes the genuine trust. The delivery-excusing gift
effected under the declaration-of-trust label is a remedial device applied to cure
a botched gift. Call something a declaration of trust, and the asset does not
pass with the donor's estate, but is treated as having been the subject of a valid
inter vivos gift to the donee. We can understand why our law might wish to
have a curative device for failure of delivery when the gift was clearly
intended, although we may lament that the measure takes the form of a
fictional declaration of trust rather than a candid harmless error doctrine.2"
The willingness of some courts to stretch the trust label to rescue imperiled
gifts ought not to be confused with the work of the modem managerial trust.
C. The Declaration of Trust as Conduit to Three-Party Trust
There is one script under which the declaration of trust ripens into a
conventional three-party trust, with a separate trustee managing the trust assets.
The settlor sets up a Dacey-type revocable declaration of trust, a nonprobate
will, but the instrument imposes a true trust on the remainder beneficiaries
after the settlor's death. The terms provide for a successor trustee to be
appointed at the settlor's death, to hold and manage the property for the benefit
of the remainderpersons. This successor trustee is functionally indistinguishable
from a testamentary trustee appointed under the will of a decedent, which is
one of the classical modes of creating a conventional three-party trust
relationship. When the successor trustee qualifies under the instrument (just as
when the probate court appoints a testamentary trustee under a will), the three-
party trust relationship (settlor, trustee, beneficiary) falls into place, with all the
attributes of contractarian trusteeship that would arise in a conventional trust
242. Discussed supra text accompanying note 30.
243. Cases are reviewed in Love, supra note 96.
244. Contrast the harmless error doctrine now in place for Wills Act execution errors. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-503, 8 U.L.A. 109 (1990).
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agreement between living settlor and third-party trustee. I have explained in the
body of this Article why testamentary trusts are contractarian despite the
settlor's death.245 Like the testamentary trustee, the successor trustee decides
whether to accept the trust on the terms contained in the instrument and in the
background default law of trusts. Although this designated successor trustee,
like a designated executor, has no one to contract with, trust law solves this
problem by saying that the trust devolves upon the court,246 which places the
court in the decedent's shoes for purposes of engaging the trustee.
To summarize: The two main uses of the declaration of trust are remote
from the function of the modem trust. Sometimes the self-declared trust is a
way station to the creation of a conventional, contractarian, three-party trust,
when a successor trustee replaces the settlor/trustee. More commonly, in the
Dacey version, the declaration of trust functions as a nontrust, borrowing the
trust label to legitimate the nonprobate will, but not evidencing that
relationship of divided management and enjoyment of trust property that is the
hallmark of the modem trust.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
246. RESTATFENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS §§ 33, 104 cmt. b, 105 cmt. b (1959). The general rule is
that equity will not allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee, and accordingly, the court will appoint a
successor trustee if the original trustee dies or resigns, and the trust instrument has not made adequate
provision for a successor trustee. See id. § 101 ("[Tlrust will not fail when the person designated as trustee
ceases for any reason to be trustee."). Likewise, the court will appoint a trustee to serve under a
testamentary trust when the will neglects to designate someone who survives. But judicial appointment still
presupposes consensual trusteeship-the person appointed must be willing to serve. The court has the power
to appoint a trustee, but not to compel someone to accept. Imagine a trust with particularly unattractive
terms, e.g., "my trustee shall be strictly liable for any decline in the value of the assets of the trust, without
regard to fault." No one would accept the trust, and the court would either allow it to fail for want of a
trustee despite Restatement § 101, or else apply the doctrine of administrative deviation, discussed supra
note 134, to strike the offending term on a finding that the settlor would have preferred the trust without
the term rather than have the trust fail.
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